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QUANTIFYING THE CONTOURS OF 
POWER: CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS & 
JUSTICE KENNEDY IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE CASES 
 
Michael A. McCall1 & Madhavi M. McCall2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
More than a decade after the United States Senate 
confirmed John Roberts as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, students of the judiciary continue to struggle to define 
the Court under his leadership.  Much of the difficulty reflects 
a continuing attempt to answer an admittedly overly simplistic 
question asked shortly after Roberts’s first year as Chief 
Justice: “Whose Court is it anyway?”3  The debate over who 
most guides the direction of the current Court typically pits the 
perceived influence of Chief Justice John Roberts against that 
of Justice Anthony Kennedy, and existing discussions have yet 
to declare a clear winner.  For example, a panel of 
constitutional law experts at an American Bar Association 
seminar in 2012 considered the question and concluded, “[i]t’s 
[b]oth the Roberts and Kennedy Court.”4 
 
1. Associate Professor of Sociology, San Diego State University.  B.S., 
University of Akron, 1989; M.A., University of Akron, 1993; Ph.D., 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2004.  Contact: mmccall@mail.sdsu.edu.   
2. Associate Dean of the College of Arts & Letters, Professor of Political 
Science, San Diego State University.  B.A., Case Western Reserve University, 
1989; M.A., University of Akron, 1993; Ph.D., Washington University in St. 
Louis, 1999. 
3.  Editorial, Whose Court Is It Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at 
A18. 
4.  Richard Brust, It’s Both the Roberts and Kennedy Court, Supreme 
Court Experts Say, ABA. J. (Aug. 3, 2012, 6:49 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/its_both_the_roberts_and_kennedy_c
ourt_supreme_court_experts_say/. 
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Popular media have echoed competing interpretations of 
the relative influence of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy.  Just a month after Time Magazine dedicated its 
cover and much of its issue to depict Justice Kennedy as “The 
Decider” on the Court,5 the same magazine focused on the 
leading role played by Chief Justice Roberts.  That issue 
carried a cover photograph of the Chief Justice and the 
headline “Roberts Rules.”6 
Neither the lack of a clear impression of who leads the 
Court nor the tendency to focus on Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kennedy as likely holders of that position7 should be 
surprising.  We might expect a high level of uncertainty, given 
that nearly half of the Court’s membership changed during the 
first six years of the Roberts Court era.8  The death of the 
Court’s former conservative leader—Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist9—in 2005 and the near simultaneous retirement10 of 
5. From Gay Marriage to Obamacare, Justice Anthony Kennedy is The
Decider, TIME MAG. (June 18, 2012), 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20120618,00.html.  
6. Roberts Rules: What His Landmark Decision Means for Obama,
Romney, the Court—and You, TIME MAG. (July 16, 2012), 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20120716,00.html.  
7. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court’s Helm, But He Isn’t
Yet in Control, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/02/washington/02scotus.html; Brust, supra
note 4; Erwin Chemerinsky, It’s Now the John Roberts Court, 15 Green Bag
2d 389 (2012).
8. John Roberts replaced Chief Justice William Rehnquist (2005),
Samuel Alito replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (2006), Sonia Sotomayor 
replaced Justice David Souter (2009), and Elena Kagan replaced Justice John 
Paul Stevens (2010).  See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2016). 
9. MICHAEL A. MCCALL, William H. Rehnquist: Leadership & Influence
from the Conservative Wing, in THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
87 (Christopher E. Smith, Christina DeJong & Michael A. McCall eds., 2011)
[HEREINAFTER THE REHNQUIST COURT]; Leigh Anne Williams, Measuring 
Internal Influence on the Rehnquist Court: An Analysis of Non-Majority 
Opinion Joining Behavior, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 679 (2007).  
10. In July 2005, Justice O’Connor announced her plans to retire, and
President George W. Bush tapped John Roberts as her replacement.  See 
Richard W. Stevenson, President Names Roberts as Choice for Chief Justice, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/06/politics/politicsspecial1/president-names-
roberts-as-choice-for-chief.html.  When William Rehnquist died two months 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/4
2016 QUANTIFYING THE CONTOURS OF POWER 117 
the frequent holder of the Court’s critical vote11—Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor—created significant power vacuums. 
The subsequent retirements of Justices David Souter12 and 
John Paul Stevens13 further clouded expectations about the 
trajectory of the Court’s decisions in a range of issue areas.14 
Some observers have claimed that the vacancy created by 
the recent death of Justice Antonin Scalia15 may have already 
altered interactions and strategies on the Court.16  While 
later, President Bush nominated Roberts as Chief Justice.  Id.  O’Connor 
agreed to stay on the Court until her new replacement (Samuel Alito) was 
found and confirmed.  See Dana Bash, Bush nominates Alito to Supreme 
Court, CNN.COM (Nov. 1, 2005, 4:39 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/SCOTUS.bush/.  
11. See, e.g., NANCY MAVEETY, QUEEN’S COURT: JUDICIAL POWER IN THE
REHNQUIST ERA 3 (2008) (“[S]he [Justice O’Connor] was the deciding vote 
across a range of legal issues coming before the justices, and her doctrinal 
and policy positions determined many minimally winning majorities.”). 
12. In May 2009, Justice Souter announced his plan to retire at the end
of June 2009.  See Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Souter’s Exit to Give Obama 
First Opening, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/02/us/02souter.html. 
13. In April 2010, Justice Stevens announced he would retire at the end
of the 2009-2010 Term.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Stevens’s 
Retirement Is Political Test for Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/us/politics/10stevens.html. 
14. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and
Prisoners’ Rights, 44 IND. L. REV. 853, 853-54, 877-80 (2011) (examining how 
membership change focuses attention on whether Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas will be able to gather support from Justice Kennedy and the Court’s 
newest members to substantially change prisoners’ rights law); David M. 
Estes, Justice Sotomayor and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: Which 
Antiestablishment Standard will Justice Sotomayor Endorse?, 11 RUTGERS 
J.L. & RELIGION 525, 525-56 (2010) (reviewing Sotomayor’s prior record to
predict her role on the Court, such as whether she might join Justice Scalia to
overrule the Lemon test); Joan Biskupic, The Alito/O’Connor Switch, 35
PEPP. L. REV. 495 (2008) (discussing the impact of Alito replacing Justice
O’Connor on the direction of the Court in areas such as providing state
legislatures more latitude to restrict abortion).
15. Adam Liptak, Justice Scalia, Who Led Court’s Conservative
Renaissance, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2016, at A1. 
16. See, e.g., Margaret Hartmann, How Scalia’s Absence Is Affecting
This Supreme Court Term, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 25, 2016, 6:14 AM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/03/how-scalias-death-affects-this-
scotus-term.html (noting key cases whose outcomes might shift in the 
absence of Justice Scalia and noting strategic choices that remaining Justices 
might make, including ordering certain cases to be reargued after a 
replacement is confirmed, producing a four-to-four tie (and thereby allowing a 
lower-court ruling to stand), and deciding whether to avoid granting 
3
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Justice Scalia’s passing significantly complicates predictions 
about the future direction and leadership of the Court, it also 
highlights the need to better identify the dynamics during 
Roberts’s first ten years as Chief Justice; the quality of 
estimates concerning the Court’s future inevitably will depend 
on the quality of our understanding of its recent past. 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy emerge as 
potential centers of gravity, in part, because they have 
assumed the roles vacated by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice O’Connor who, themselves, were depicted as 
particularly strong forces on the Court.17  Chief Justice 
Roberts, who clerked for Chief Justice Rehnquist, has been 
likened to his former boss in being a skillful strategist18 and 
conservative jurist.19  Justice Kennedy, who was Justice 
O’Connor’s only serious challenger for the spot of “median 
Justice” late in the Rehnquist Court era,20 has held an 
certiorari in the future to those cases that are likely to produce a deadlocked 
vote); Tom Pryor, Timothy R. Johnson & Valerie Hoekstra, How many cases 
will the Supreme Court put off till next term? Maybe none, WASH. POST (Mar. 
25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/03/25/how-many-cases-will-the-supreme-court-put-off-till-next-
term-maybe-none/?postshare=90214589 (analyzing historical data to predict 
strategic choices given the Court’s vacancy, and expecting a large number of 
four-to-four decisions); Mark Joseph Stern, The First Day of the New Supreme 
Court, SLATE (Feb. 23, 2016, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2
016/02/in_the_oral_arguments_for_utah_v_strieff_the_supreme_court_s_liber
als_spoke.html (suggesting liberal Justices might feel empowered to 
challenge the expansion of the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule 
on a Court that now appears to be divided four-to-four). 
17. See, e.g., MAVEETY, supra note 11; Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A.
McCall, Chief Justice William Rehnquist: His Law-and-Order Legacy and 
Impact on Criminal Justice, 39 AKRON L. REV. 323 (2006). 
18. Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2009, at A1. 
19. Joan Biskupic, Roberts, Rehnquist Compel Comparisons, USA
TODAY (Sept. 6, 2005, 10:55 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-06-comparing-
judges_x.htm; Stevenson, supra note 10. 
20. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The
Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 
1291 (2005); Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The “Swing Voter” 
Revisited: Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free 
Speech, 57 POL. RES. Q. 209 (2004). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/4
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increasingly pivotal vote after Justice O’Connor’s retirement.21  
However, careful estimation of the relative influence of Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy has received little 
systematic scrutiny to date.  Indeed, little has been proposed 
regarding how to make such an assessment. 
This Article seeks to fill some of this void and contribute to 
the debate with an empirical analysis of voting behavior in 
criminal justice cases decided during the first ten Terms of the 
Roberts Court era.  The following section presents the study’s 
case selection and introduces the types of measures used to 
illuminate influence on the High Court (Part II).  Court- and 
individual-level tendencies (Part III) identify potential spheres 
of influence occupied by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy.  These bases of judicial power are examined 
separately in Part IV (Chief Justice Roberts) and Part V 
(Justice Kennedy).  Some possible implications of Justice 
Scalia’s death on these power bases are addressed in Part VI. 
The analyses provide a sketch of some of the settings in 
which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy wield 
influence.  A central goal motivating this study is to identify 
comparative measures that are more informative and less 
sensitive than the types of anecdotal evidence arising from 
celebrated cases frequently covered by the media.  The purpose 
is to provide a better understanding of patterns in voting 
tendencies, rather than to address the ability of Chief Justice 
Roberts or Justice Kennedy to affect policy or doctrinal 
approaches per se.  The focus on criminal justice cases captures 
a large segment of the Court’s production while avoiding the 
overly ambitious (and likely misleading) attempt to assess 
avenues of influence across all types of cases and issue areas. 
The reader seeking the definitive answer to, “Whose Court 
is it?” will be disappointed.  This Article strives to inform, 
rather than to end, that debate by providing some much-
needed context through quantifiable dimensions on which 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy seem to be 
21. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Kennedy Reigns Supreme on Court: With
O’Connor’s Departure, Sole Swing Voter Wields His Moderating Force, WASH. 
POST, Jul. 2, 2006, at A6 (“With the departure of centrist Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, the court is now frequently split between two four-justice liberal 
and conservative blocs, with Kennedy as the sole remaining swing voter.”). 
5
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particularly influential.  The most confident estimate of who 
leads the Court in the area of criminal justice will require an 
understanding of this context coupled with a rigorous analysis 
contrasting the impact of Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial 
philosophies and interpretations to those of Justice Kennedy—
a task we leave for others. 
II. CASE SELECTION & ANALYTICAL APPROACH
This Article analyzes decisions by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in criminal justice cases during the first ten 
Terms of the Roberts Court.  Criminal justice issues represent 
a significant portion of the Court’s docket22 and produce 
decisions that often reveal the tension between individual 
rights and some of government’s most significant abilities to 
exert control over its citizens. 
A review of Supreme Court decisions handed down from 
the 2005-2006 Term through the 2014-2015 Term identified 
over 300 cases raising criminal justice issues.23  Narrowing 
attention to full, signed opinions excluded several per curiam 
decisions, and cases consolidated with another to produce 
single, full decisions.24  The selection process yielded 264 cases 
22. See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme
Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1229-33 (2012) 
(showing that as the Court’s overall caseload decreased in recent decades, the 
percentage of criminal procedure and due process cases increased). 
23. The authors reviewed all Court decisions for each of the ten terms
using lists of cases generated by the Court and SCOTUSblog.com.  See, e.g., 
2012 Term Opinions of the Court, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/12 (last visited Nov. 29, 
2016); Kedar S. Bhatia, Stat Pack for October Term 2015, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 29, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/SB_stat_pack_OT15.pdf.  A case was selected for 
purposes of this Article if the decision included a significant focus on at least 
one criminal justice issue. 
24. Two consolidated cases addressing whether the use of victims’
statements at trial—in which the victims themselves do not testify—violates 
protections under the Confrontation Clause are included separately in this 
study because the ruling was mixed.  The case of Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006), ended in a conservative outcome (finding that statements are 
nontestimonial if they result from an interrogation whose primary purpose is 
to respond to an emergency), while Hammon v. Indiana, 546 U.S. 976 (2005), 
produced a liberal ruling (excluding certain statements to police made in the 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/4
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for analysis.25 
To assess the relative influence of the two jurists of prime 
interest, we introduce new performance indicators and present 
findings using more traditional measures as well.  Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy are evaluated with 
respect to their rates of participation in majority opinions, 
ability to muster support for positions as gauged by inter-
agreement scores and voting bloc distributions, frequency of 
majority opinion authorship, their roles in the Court’s most 
divided criminal justice decisions, their scores on various 
dimensions of conservatism, and in other ways.26 
While we discuss the value of each metric later in this 
Article, one component warrants discussion here because it 
establishes much of the context within which to evaluate the 
other measures: the relative conservatism or liberalism of 
Justices and decisions.  A common perception holds that the 
Justices group into one of two philosophical camps 
characterized by different interpretational approaches—a 
liberal wing and a conservative wing.27  Judicial scholars often 
label decisions,28 Justices29 and entire Courts30 as being 
course of investigation rather than under exigent circumstances). 
25. Nearly all of the excluded criminal justice cases were excluded
because they ended in a per curiam decision.  Such Court decisions do not 
permit analysis of opinion authorship—a topic of interest in this study.  See, 
e.g., infra Part V.B.
26. See infra Parts III-V.
27. E.g., Hannah Fairfield & Adam Liptak, A More Nuanced Breakdown
of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/upshot/a-more-nuanced-breakdown-of-
the-supreme-court.html. 
28. See, e.g., Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E.
Smith, Criminal Justice and the 2012-2013 United States Supreme Court 
Term, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 35, 57 (2014) (“In an important liberal, five-to-
four ruling, the Court determined in Florida v. Jardines [133 S. Ct. 1409 
(2013)] that police use of a drug-sniffing dog was a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
29. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey
A. Segal, Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and
How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1490-91 (2007) (analyzing Justices’
liberal and conservative voting trends).
30. See, e.g., Herman Schwartz, Introduction, in THE REHNQUIST COURT:
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 13 (Herman Schwartz ed. 2002) (“The 
Rehnquist Court is the most conservative Supreme Court since before the 
New Deal.”); Richard G. Wilkins, Scott Worthington, Jacob Reynolds & John 
7
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predominantly conservative or liberal.  Despite the 
oversimplification that such designations risk, the approach 
can prove helpful to the degree that the conservative and 
liberal labels offer insight into judicial philosophies31 and 
reflect the likelihood that a Justice or Court might express 
certain positions.32 
Throughout this analysis, we apply the term “liberal” to 
characterize Court decisions and individual votes favoring the 
person accused or convicted of a crime, or against government 
in matters of due process or privacy; “conservative” decisions 
and votes, then, are those supporting government interests in 
criminal justice cases.33  These definitions reflect reasonably 
well the competing value systems in criminal justice that 
Herbert Packer, Professor of Law at Stanford University, 
J. Nielsen, Supreme Court Voting Behavior 2004 Term, 32 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 909, 909 (2005) (adding to a series of studies measuring “whether
individual Justices and the Court as a whole are voting more ‘conservatively,’
more ‘liberally,’ or about the same when compared with past Terms”); Russell
W. Galloway, Jr., The Third Period of the Warren Court: Liberal Dominance
(1962-1969), 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 773, 775 n.7 (1980) (examining the
voting on the Warren Court and noting, “[i]t is probably safe to say that at no
time in its previous history had the United States Supreme Court had so
liberal a panel of justices”).
31. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE
CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 6-15 (1997) (describing Justice Scalia’s decision-
making as rooted in his conservatism and in his association with the 
jurisprudential school of Reasoned Elaboration); Sue Davis, Justice 
Rehnquist’s Judicial Philosophy: Democracy v. Equality, 17 POLITY 88, 91 
(1984) (noting that Rehnquist’s brand of conservatism tended to emphasize 
“majority rule and the elected officials’ accountability via the electoral 
process while de-emphasizing the notion that the Constitution protects 
certain individual rights regardless of the will of the majority”). 
32. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Justice Souter Emerges, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Sept. 25, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/25/magazine/justice-souter-
emerges.html?pagewanted=all ) (quoting Linda Greenhouse of The New York 
Times who noted that Justice Souter’s moderate pragmatism “is probably as 
responsible as any single factor for the failure of the conservative revolution” 
in American constitutional law); Epstein et al., supra note 29, at 1528-41 
(explaining certain case outcomes through change in ideological leanings of 
Justices, and discussing implications for doctrinal change on the Roberts 
Court). 
33. These definitions follow those in the Supreme Court Judicial
Database.  See HAROLD J. SPAETH ET AL., THE SUP. CT. DATABASE CODE BOOK
(2015), 
http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/_brickFiles/2015_02/SCDB_2015_02_c
odebook.pdf. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/4
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identified decades ago as the due process model and crime 
control model.34 
We depart from the general strategy (e.g., pro-individual 
as liberal) in one area—gun control—only when restriction on 
the general lawfulness of gun ownership or gun purchasing is 
at issue.35  A pro-individual position, here, aligns more with 
conservative sentiments in the broader political context.  This 
departure from the standard classification scheme leads to 
labeling two individual rights-affirming decisions as 
“conservative” and one rights-restricting ruling as “liberal.” 
Specifically, the Court’s decisions expanding rights under the 
Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller36 and 
McDonald v.  City of Chicago37 are coded as conservative.  The 
Court in Abramski v. United States upheld the conviction of a 
gun buyer who (while otherwise eligible to legally purchase a 
firearm) falsely claimed he was purchasing the gun for himself, 
and the ruling is treated as liberal.38  If Heller and McDonald 
were coded using the general classification, they would be only 
two instances in the 264 cases reviewed in which all liberal 
members of the Court dissented from a liberal decision. 
Similarly, if Abramski were counted as a conservative decision, 
it would be the only conservative ruling in this study in which 
the four most conservative members of the Court39 dissented. 
Adjusting the coding of these three cases to match generally 
held conservative and liberal attitudes avoids obfuscating 
patterns of greater interest in this study. 
Twelve Justices served on the Roberts Court during the 
period examined.  Although Justices Stevens, Souter, 
34. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 (1964).
35. The standard labels apply to other gun-related cases, such as those
concerning sentence-enhancements.  In those cases, the pro-law enforcement 
position of seeking more severe penalties for crimes committed with a firearm 
is consistent with commonly held conservative views.  E.g., Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009). 
36. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
37. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
38. Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014).
39. See infra Table 2 (showing Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito,
Thomas and Scalia as having the most conservative voting records in 
criminal justice cases). 
9
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Sotomayor, and Kagan did not serve during all Terms, each 
posted a sufficient number of votes to permit meaningful 
interpretation of related trends.  We do not attempt to analyze 
Justice O’Connor’s role; she was part of only six criminal 
justice decisions by the Roberts Court before her retirement. 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DECISIONS 
A. Institutional-level Characteristics
Legal commentators typically portray the first decade of 
the Roberts Court as being solidly conservative.40  The initial 
assessment of criminal justice decisions partially corroborates 
that reputation and suggests that the Rehnquist Court’s 
tendency to favor law enforcement41 continued under Chief 
Justice Roberts.  As shown in Table 1, nearly two-thirds of 
unanimous criminal justice cases decided during the first ten 
Terms of the Roberts Court era ended in a conservative 
outcome.42 
However, the distribution also reveals a fractured Court. 
Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s expressed goal of forging 
greater consensus on the bench,43 not only were most decisions 
non-unanimous, but many were also deeply divided.  While the 
Roberts Court decided 118 criminal justice cases (45 percent) 
40. E.g., MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
CONSTITUTION 3 (2013) (describing the Roberts Court as having “a confident 
conservative majority with a muscular sense of power”); Joan Biskupic, Key 
Events in Chief Justice John Roberts’ Tenure: Reshaped Supreme Court 
Charts New Era, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2010, 6:23 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-10-01-
court01_ST_N.htm (“The court under Chief Justice John Roberts has pushed 
the law to the right . . . .”); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most 
Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html?_r=0 (reporting on a 
statistical analysis of Court eras).  
41. McCall & McCall, supra note 17, at 332-36.
42. See infra Table 1 (showing that sixty of ninety-two unanimous
criminal justice decisions during this period produced a conservative 
outcome). 
43. The Associated Press, Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More
Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at A16. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/4
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either unanimously or with a single dissenting vote, another 
106 cases (40 percent) each produced at least three dissenters. 
TABLE 1:  DISTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISIONS BY 
LIBERAL & CONSERVATIVE OUTCOME, 2005-2015 
Majority44 Liberal Conservative Total (%) 
Unanimous 32 60 92 (34.8) 
Non-
unanimous 85 87 172 (65.2)
Five-Member 39 31 70 (26.5) 
All 117 (44%) 147 (56%) 264 
Moreover, the probability of a liberal criminal justice 
decision has been greatest in cases that divided the Roberts 
Court.  A liberal outcome characterizes virtually half of non-
unanimous decisions—compared to about a third of unanimous 
decisions—and minimally-winning majorities have been most 
likely to support the position of the prisoner or criminally 
accused over government interests.45  Judicial scholars and 
commentators often have particular interest in five-to-four 
decisions, given the large portion of cases decided during the 
Roberts Court era ending in such a narrow majority46 and 
44. “Five-member” majority decisions are included in “Non-unanimous.”
The five-member category includes six cases decided five-to-three.  During its 
first ten Terms, the Roberts Court decided twenty-six criminal justice cases 
with eight members due to a Justice’s recusal (Justice Kagan thirteen times, 
Justice Alito nine times, Justice Sotomayor twice, Chief Justice Roberts once, 
and Justice Breyer once). 
45. See supra Table 1 (showing that a liberal outcome was produced in
thirty-nine of seventy—or 56 percent—of criminal justice decisions ending in 
a five-member majority).  
46. E.g., Christopher E. Smith, Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A.
McCall, The Roberts Court and Criminal Justice: An Empirical Assessment, 
40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 416 (2015); David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible 
Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (June 29, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-
polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/ (noting the 
historically high level of five-to-four decisions by the Roberts Court and that 
“[s]cholars consider these narrow decisions the most political.  Research 
indicates that five-to-four rulings are the most likely to be overturned by 
later Courts.  They carry the same legal authority as more unanimous 
11
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because “[t]he most closely divided rulings of the Roberts Court 
reveal sharply divergent views of history, approaches to 
interpreting the Constitution, the role of government in 
American lives, and what makes a just society.”47 
This first glance at rulings by the Roberts Court suggests 
potential bases of significant power for both the Chief Justice 
and Justice Kennedy.  As head of a conservative Court, Chief 
Justice Roberts has had substantial opportunities to shape 
criminal law in a more conservative direction.  At the same 
time, Justice Kennedy’s oft-stated influence as a pivotal vote 
appears especially worthy of scrutiny in criminal justice cases 
given the high proportion of these cases decided by the thinnest 
of majorities. 
B. Two Camps in Criminal Justice
Although institutional-level descriptors are informative, 
examining trends in the voting behavior of individual Justices 
better assesses the accuracy of assumptions regarding 
conservatism on the Court, and further clarifies some of the 
influential roles played by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy.  Findings presented in Table 2 comport with the 
common impression that the Justices fall roughly into one of 
two camps, and that the Court’s newest members have not 
dramatically altered its rightward tilt.  The records of Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito establish both as dependable 
conservatives in criminal justice cases.  Justices Sotomayor and 
Kagan seem at home in the left wing of the Court, though their 
more limited service to date cautions that this is a tentative 
assessment.  Among members just prior to Justice Scalia’s 
death in February 2016, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
opinions—but not the same moral authority.”); Juliet Lapidos, Five-Four, 
N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (June 18, 2012), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/five-four/ (calculating that, 
regarding cases across all issue areas since 1946, “Chief Justice Roberts 
doesn’t just hold the single-term record—he beats other chief justices for the 
greatest share of five-four splits over his career to date: 22.2 percent, versus 
20.3 for William Rehnquist, 16.9 for Warren Burger, 11.7 for Earl Warren 
and 15 for Fred Vinson”).  
47. COYLE, supra note 40, at 4.
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Kennedy, Justice Alito, Justice Thomas, and Justice Scalia 
were each much more likely than Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor and Kagan to support government’s law 
enforcement interests in criminal justice cases. 
TABLE 2:  CONSERVATIVE, MAJORITY & SELECT DISSENT VOTING 
RATES IN ALL CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES, 2005-2015, BY JUSTICE 
Percent of each Justice’s votes that were: 
Justice (n 
votes)48 Conservative 
In the 
Majority 
Solo 
dissents or 
one of only 
two 
dissenters 
Alito (249) 80.7 75.1 5.6 
Thomas (264) 76.5 72.3 9.5 
Roberts (263) 68.1 84.0 0.8 
Scalia (264) 66.7 76.9 5.7 
Kennedy 
(264) 59.1 91.3 1.1
Breyer (263) 42.6 78.7 3.8 
Sotomayor 
(151) 36.4 82.1 2.6 
Ginsburg (264) 36.4 77.7 4.9 
Kagan (111) 36.0 84.7 0.9 
Souter (111) 36.0 75.7 4.5 
Stevens (140) 33.6 70.7 10.0 
Presumably, the sincerest representations of judicial 
preferences are expressed most often in non-unanimous 
decisions, at least to the degree that votes in such cases do not 
reflect the compromising of positions purely for the sake of 
unanimity.49  Data supports this contention and reveals the 
48. Justice Sandra O’Connor participated in six of these decisions (four
unanimous and two non-unanimous) before her retirement.  The low number 
of Justice O’Connor’s votes prohibits a meaningful analysis of her voting 
patterns on the Roberts Court. 
49. See e.g., C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN
13
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extent of ideological distance between the two wings of the 
Court.  For example, 73 percent of the votes cast by members of 
the conservative wing in non-unanimous, criminal justice cases 
supported the conservative position; conversely, 77 percent of 
the votes from the remaining Justices favored the liberal 
position.50 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy rank atop all 
others for being in the most criminal justice majorities in 
decisions.51  Nearly four out of every five decisions by the Court 
during the period analyzed ended with both Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Kennedy on the winning side.52  
Remarkably, only ten criminal justice cases decided during 
these ten Terms ended with both Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kennedy dissenting.53 
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES xii (1948) (non-unanimous decisions permit 
Justices to “supply information about their attitudes and their values which 
is available in no other way.”); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10:2 SOC’Y FOR POL. METHODOLOGY 134-35, 137 
n.3 (2002),
https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/116239/pa02.pdf?seq
uence=1&isAllowed=y (stating that they “suspect that unanimity results 
from motivations rooted in institutional legitimacy” and  estimating Justices’ 
preferred positions exclusively in non-unanimous cases). 
50. Of the 853 votes cast by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy,
Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Scalia in non-unanimous, criminal 
justice cases decided from 2005-2015, 619 favored a conservative outcome, 
while 524 of 680 votes cast by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, 
Sotomayor and Kagan favored a liberal outcome.  See infra Table 4 for 
percentages of individual Justices. 
51. See supra Table 2.  Justice Kagan’s majority participation rate (84.7
percent) is slightly higher than Chief Justice Roberts’s (84.0 percent). 
However, as the Court’s newest member, Justice Kagan has voted with the 
majority in far fewer cases (94) than has Chief Justice Roberts (221). 
52. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy voted together and with
the majority in 208 of the 263 cases (79.1 percent) in which they both 
participated.  The Chief Justice did not participate in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
53. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy casted dissenting
votes in ten of the cases examined.  These are: Alleyne v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 2151 (2013); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011); Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010);
Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332
(2009); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); United States
v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008); Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008);
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
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Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy have been 
especially unlikely to dissent against large majorities, such as 
in eight-to-one and seven-to-two decisions.  In contrast, one of 
every ten votes cast in a criminal justice case by liberal 
stalwart54 Justice Stevens during this period was as a sole 
dissenter or with only one other Justice.  Moreover, with the 
exception of relative newcomer Justice Elena Kagan, who 
participated in far fewer cases, Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kennedy are the only members of the Court who did 
not file a single, lone dissent in a criminal justice case from 
2005-2015.55 
Interestingly, the other three conservatives on the Court 
exhibited a willingness to break from large majorities.  Indeed, 
Justices Alito, Thomas and Scalia account for three of every 
five lone dissents in criminal justice cases decided during the 
period examined,56 and the rate of dissenting either alone or 
with only one other Justice is over 50 percent higher for Alito, 
Scalia and Thomas than for those commonly perceived to be in 
the left wing of the Court.57 
Although most of the dissents by Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito were against liberal majorities, Justices Scalia and 
Thomas recorded twelve dissenting votes in nine cases decided 
by large majorities, producing conservative outcomes.58  Chief 
54. Christopher E. Smith & Michael A. McCall, Introduction, in
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CHRISTINA DEJONG & MICHAEL A. MCCALL (eds. 2011),
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 7 (presenting lifetime voting 
records that rank Stevens among the most liberal Rehnquist Court Justices 
in criminal procedure cases). 
55. Justice Thomas dissented most often (ten times) from an otherwise
unanimous Court.  Justices Stevens and Alito were each lone dissenters four 
times.  Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Sotomayor each cast the lone dissent in 
two criminal justice cases, while Justices Breyer and Souter did so once each. 
56. Justices Alito, Scalia and Thomas wrote sixteen of the twenty-six
solo dissents in the cases analyzed. 
57. Of the 777 votes cast by Justices Scalia, Alito and Thomas, fifty-four
(6.9 percent) of the votes placed one of them in a very small minority of no 
larger than two dissenters.  Of the 1,040 votes by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Souter, Sotomayor and Kagan, forty-seven (4.5 percent) votes 
produced such a result.  See supra Table 2. 
58. Justice Alito did not dissent against a single conservative majority
of any size.  See infra Table 7.  Thomas and Scalia were the only dissenters in 
United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013); United States v. 
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010); and Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
15
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Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy were almost always in the 
conservative majority in these instances.59  The willingness of 
Justices Scalia and Thomas to dissent—especially when a 
criminal justice case raised other types of issues of greater 
importance to them60—exposes limits to the ability of Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy to keep the conservative 
bloc together in some instances. 
Rates of being in the majority are important for the 
obvious reason that it is difficult to be particularly influential, 
at least in the short term, if routinely absent from the group 
whose interpretation of law is authoritative.  This underscores 
the value of examining the influence of Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Kennedy in that at least one (and usually both) of 
these Justices helped shape law as members of the majority in 
254 of the 264 criminal justice cases decided during the first 
ten years of the Roberts Court era.61 
Majority participation has particular relevance to Roberts 
in that, as Chief Justice, he assigns the Court’s opinion when 
he is in the majority.62  A frequent member of the majority, 
Chief Justice Roberts routinely holds this power.  Justice 
Kennedy supported the majority position more often still,63 
and, as discussed later, many of his opinion-writing 
opportunities have not been dependent on Chief Justice 
Roberts.64  We turn, first, to the Chief Justice and his most 
Justice Thomas dissented (with Justice Kennedy) in Camreta v. Greene, 563 
U.S. 692 (2011) and was the sole dissenter in Gonzalez v. United States, 553 
U.S. 242 (2008).  Justice Scalia was the sole dissenter in United States v. 
Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007), and one of two dissenters in San 
Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 
344 (2011) and (along with Chief Justice Roberts) in United States v. Hayes, 
555 U.S. 415 (2009). 
59. For exceptions, see Camreta, 563 U.S. at 716, and Hayes, 555 U.S.
at 430.  
60. For examples of Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s dissents from large
conservative, majority opinions, which they perceived inappropriately 
expanded federal power, see Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2509, and Comstock, 
560 U.S. at 158-59 (2010). 
61. See supra note 53 (listing the ten criminal justice cases in which
both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy dissented). 
62. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 133 (7th ed. 1992).
63. See supra Table 2.
64. See infra Part V.B.
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important administrative power65—assigning the Court’s 
opinion when in the majority.66 
IV. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS
A. Chief Justice Roberts as Assigner of Majority
Opinions 
Generations of scholars have analyzed the distribution of 
opinion assignments in evaluating Chief Justices’ decision-
making processes and exercise of power.67  Deciding who writes 
the Court’s opinion can determine the quality and scope of 
rulings, the efficiency in which they are produced, whether 
majority coalitions are maintained, and the degree to which 
policy preferences of the assigner are emphasized.68  Each of 
these considerations is constrained by an equity assumption 
among Court members—that each will receive his or her ‘fair 
share’ of assignments.69  Although data limitations prevent a 
systematic testing of strategies Chief Justice Roberts might 
65. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, “The Administrative Side” of Chief
Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1949) (“Perhaps no aspect of the 
‘administrative side’ that is vested in the Chief Justice is more important 
than the duty to assign the writing of the Court’s opinion.”). 
66. We follow the practice common among judicial scholars of assuming
that the Chief Justice assigns the opinion when in the majority and that the 
most senior Associate Justice does so when the Chief Justice dissents or does 
not participate.  If Chief Justice Roberts joined a majority after dissenting at 
the initial conference vote, this assumption would lead to the incorrect 
identification of Chief Justice Roberts as having assigned the opinion.  See 
LEE EPSTEIN ET. AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND
DEVELOPMENTS 425-26 (1994). 
67. E.g., WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964);
Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion 
Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421 (1996); Saul 
Brenner, Issue Specialization as a Variable in Opinion Assignment on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 46 J. POL. 1217 (1984); Elliot E. Slotnick, Who Speaks 
for the Court? Majority Opinion Assignments from Taft to Burger, 23 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 60 (1979).  
68. See Sandra L. Wood et al., Opinion Assignment and the Chief
Justice: 1888-1940, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 798, 798-800 (2000) (summarizing 
traditional models that explain opinion assignment choices). 
69. See generally Sara C. Benesh et al., Equity in Supreme Court
Opinion Assignment, 39 JURIMETRICS 377 (1999) (analyzing more than four 
decades of opinion assignments in terms of distributional equality). 
17
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pursue in assigning the Court’s criminal justice opinions,70 
patterns provide tentative support for certain interpretations of 
the Chief Justice’s decision calculus. 
Table 3 presents the distribution of authorship of the 
Court’s criminal justice decisions when Chief Justice Roberts 
was in the majority.  Given that any Chief Justice’s strategic 
choices are constrained by the voting tendencies of others,71 the 
allocation of writing opportunities is surprisingly even.  For 
example, Justices Alito, Scalia, Breyer, and Ginsburg each 
authored thirteen unanimous decisions for the Court.72  
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts assigned unanimous, liberal 
criminal justice decisions to members of the conservative 
wing—and unanimous conservative decisions to liberal 
Justices—in almost precise proportion to the conservative-
liberal composition of the Court.73 
70. For example, a full examination of the possible influence of the
equity expectation requires consideration of the distribution of opinion 
authorship across the Court’s complete docket of cases and not just a subset 
of criminal justice decisions. 
71. E.g., Justice Stevens received relatively few assignments from Chief
Justice Roberts in part because Justice Stevens—the Justice least likely to 
agree with Roberts in criminal justice cases—often was not in the majority 
when Chief Justice Roberts was.  See infra Table 4.  Similarly, it is not 
surprising that Chief Justice Roberts assigned Justices Thomas and Alito a 
total of forty-two conservative and only eleven liberal opinions, given that 
these two jurists have been by far the least likely members of the Court to 
join a liberal majority.  See infra Table 3, Table 7. 
72. See infra Table 3.
73. If assignments were randomly distributed, we would expect the five
more conservative Justices to author eighteen of the thirty-two liberal, 
unanimous decisions; they actually wrote nineteen.  The more liberal Justices 
wrote twenty-six of the sixty conservative, unanimous decisions, versus the 
random expectation of twenty-seven.  
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/4
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TABLE 3:  OPINION ASSIGNMENTS BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS74 
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES, BY JUSTICE AND MAJORITY TYPE, 
2005-2015   
Majority opinions authored by type of majority 
Unanimous Non-Unanimous 
Five-
Member 
Author Total Con Lib Con Lib Con Lib 
Alito 30 8 5 16 1 7 0 
Scalia 28 10 3 10 5 4 0 
Roberts 27 5 5 13 4 3 1 
Breyer 27 10 3 9 5 0 0 
Ginsburg 26 11 2 4 9 0 1 
Thomas 23 6 4 12 1 7 0 
Kennedy 21 5 2 8 6 6 1 
Sotomayor 11 3 0 3 5 0 0 
Stevens 10 0 1 4 5 1 0 
Kagan 10 2 3 2 3 0 0 
Souter 8 0 4 1 3 0 0 
TOTAL 221 60 32 82 47 28 3 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were among the most 
frequent authors of conservative, unanimous opinions, while no 
one wrote more unanimous, liberal criminal justice opinions 
than the Chief Justice.  Notably, the Justices with the most 
polar voting patterns received relatively few assignments for a 
unanimous Court in the direction one might expect.  Justice 
Alito authored only eight conservative Court opinions without 
dissent and Justice Stevens wrote only one liberal one.  Chief 
Justice Roberts assigned eleven conservative, unanimous 
opinions to Justice Ginsburg, but only two liberal ones. 
These somewhat curious tendencies are made less puzzling 
considering the strategic choices Chief Justice Roberts might 
be making in his assignment of opinions.  Although unanimous, 
74. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 66, at 425-26 (regarding assumptions
about opinion assignments). 
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conservative decisions provide Chief Justice Roberts with 
opportunities to vigorously pursue his policy goals by assigning 
opinions to close ideological allies, his frequent use of Justices 
from the liberal wing to craft these opinions helps preserve 
unanimity by minimizing the risk of defection from the 
majority,75 thereby accomplishing his goal of fostering greater 
consensus on the Court.76 
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that a skillful 
strategist like Chief Justice Roberts77 understands that every 
conservative, unanimous (and presumably less controversial) 
decision written by liberal Justices like Ginsburg reduces the 
amount of time such Justices have to author opinions in more 
divisive cases.  Meanwhile, assigning more than half of the 
Court’s liberal, unanimous decisions to members of the 
conservative wing not only minimizes defection from the 
majority, but also likely constrains the scope of liberalism in 
some of these opinions and lessens the degree to which the 
resulting policies diverge from the Chief Justice’s preferred 
positions. 
Other potential evidence of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
strategic use of opinion assignments emerges from the findings. 
For instance, the Chief Justice relied extensively on the 
relatively moderate Justice Breyer78 to write majority opinions 
in cases raising criminal justice issues, especially when the 
Court ruled in favor of government interests.  Of Justice 
Breyer’s twenty-seven majority opinions likely assigned by 
Chief Justice Roberts, nineteen opinions were in cases 
producing a conservative outcome.79 
75. Scholars have long noted the logic of such an opinion assignment
strategy though, understandably, most attention has been given to choices 
that minimize defection when the majority is fragile.  See, e.g., David J. 
Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the 
Supreme Court, in THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 147 (Thomas P. Jahnige & 
Sheldon Goldman eds. 1968); David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic, Choice 
and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. 
POL. SCI. 652 (1972).  
76. See The Associated Press, supra note 43.
77. See Liptak, supra note 18.
78. See supra Table 2 (showing that Justice Breyer posted the most
conservative voting rate in criminal justice cases among those considered to 
be liberal Justices). 
79. See supra Table 3.
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Also, in the rare instances in which Chief Justice Roberts 
was part of a five-member majority handing down a liberal 
criminal justice decision, the author of the Court’s decision 
tended to come from the conservative wing.  For example, Chief 
Justice Roberts self-assigned the decision in Hemi Group, LLC 
v. City of New York,80 and joined the opinion in Arizona v.
United States,81 authored by his fellow conservative, Justice
Kennedy.82
While in those cases Chief Justice Roberts’s assignment 
choices may have been motivated by an attempt to limit the 
degree of liberalism expressed in the Court’s decision, 
elsewhere he may have been more concerned with maintaining 
a fragile, conservative majority.  When the Court decided a 
sentencing guidelines case with a five-member majority that 
did not include Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts 
assigned the conservative opinion to Justice Stevens, the only 
majority member from the liberal wing.83  Furthermore, in the 
only conservative criminal justice decision that Chief Justice 
Roberts assigned to Justice Souter (Clark v. Arizona),84 Justice 
Souter’s vote was critical.  In Clark, the only other Justice from 
80. Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2010) (holding
that the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act cannot be used 
to collect damages from out-of-state internet vendors who fail to pay city 
taxes on cigarettes). 
81. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510-11 (2012) (holding
key sections of Arizona’s immigration law were preempted by federal law). 
82. Of the cases analyzed, the only other marginally-winning, liberal
majority in which Chief Justice Roberts was a member was Yates v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1087 (2015) (defining the meaning of “tangible 
objects” for the purposes of federal legislation originally enacted to combat 
securities and financial fraud).  Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court.  Id. at 
1078.  Chief Justice Roberts’s options were more constrained because the only 
other conservative Justice in the majority wrote a concurring opinion to 
assert the decision should have been based on grounds more narrow than 
those used by the majority.  See id. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring). 
83. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 715-16 (2008) (holding that
an above-guidelines sentence imposed a variance rather than a departure 
from the guidelines and, thus, the judge was not required to provide both 
sides with notice before imposing the sentence). 
84. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 742 (2006) (holding that due process
does not prohibit the state from using an insanity test that measures only the 
ability of the defendant to determine whether an act is right or wrong and 
limiting defendant’s evidence of mental defect to that which is relevant to the 
test).   
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the liberal wing to join the six-member majority opinion also 
dissented in part, making it a tenuous majority.85 
In most instances, however, the size and cohesiveness of 
the conservative bloc meant that Chief Justice Roberts did not 
need to garner support from a member of the liberal wing in 
order to preserve a conservative outcome.86  Yet here—in non-
unanimous, conservative decisions that rarely depended on 
recruiting a member from the liberal wing—Chief Justice 
Roberts assigned a disproportionate number of opinions to the 
more liberal Justices.  Specifically, the Chief Justice assigned 
nearly 30 percent of the non-unanimous, conservative decisions 
to members of the liberal wing, even though these Justices 
provided less than one-fourth of the majority votes in these 
cases.87 
The findings also tentatively support Professor Wahlbeck’s 
prediction that, in many instances, the conservative tilt of the 
Court would permit Chief Justice Roberts to distribute opinion 
assignments across several Justices without risking that the 
outcome would stray far from his preferred position.88  As 
shown previously in Table 3, Chief Justice Roberts assigned 
non-unanimous opinions rather evenly to his fellow members of 
the conservative wing (seventeen each to himself and Justice 
Alito, and thirteen to fifteen each to Justices Scalia, Kennedy 
and Thomas). 
85. Id. at 779-80 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Souter’s vote was especially important given that Justice Breyer 
would have remanded the case to the state court. 
86. A supporting vote from a Justice in the liberal wing to produce a
conservative decision for a five-member majority that included Chief Justice 
Roberts occurred in only five of the 264 analyzed cases.  See Navarette v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013); 
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 
708 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
87. Members of the liberal wing wrote twenty-three of the eighty-two
non-unanimous, conservative decisions (28 percent) that included Roberts in 
the majority.  In those eighty-two cases, liberal Justices provided only 120 of 
the 504 votes (23.8 percent) supporting the majority. 
88. Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court
Opinion Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1754-55 (2006) (predicting that 
“Chief Justice Roberts will enjoy leading a Court where the median is a 
relatively conservative voice. This will enable him to distribute opinion 
assignments across many Justices without any discernible policy loss.”). 
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B. Chief Justice Roberts as Leader of the
Conservative Core 
When broad consensus is achieved, Chief Justice Roberts 
benefits from leading a Court that overwhelmingly supports 
conservative outcomes in criminal justice cases.89  Of course, 
dissents are hardly rare on the Roberts Court, and 
philosophical differences between Justices and shared voting 
patterns among them are clarified when attention is focused on 
non-unanimous decisions.90  Tendencies regarding the voting 
behavior of individual Justices in non-unanimous, criminal 
justice cases are summarized in Table 4. 
The findings depict Chief Justice Roberts as occupying a 
powerful position in the middle of the conservative bloc during 
his first ten years on as Chief Justice.  Justices Alito and 
Thomas have been more inclined than Roberts to support 
government interests in deterring, investigating and punishing 
criminal behavior, while Justice Scalia (slightly) and Justice 
Kennedy (considerably) had been more likely than Chief 
Justice Roberts to favor claims of prisoners and of the 
criminally accused.91 
89. See supra Table 1 (showing that unanimous conservative decisions
outnumber liberal ones by nearly two-to-one). 
90. Christopher E. Smith, Michael A. McCall & Madhavi M. McCall,
Criminal Justice and the 2005-2006 United States Supreme Court Term, 25 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 495, 504 (2007) (“[T]he philosophical divisions between 
the Justices concerning criminal justice cases become accentuated when 
unanimous cases are removed from the analysis.”); Christopher E. Smith, 
Polarization and Change in the Federal Courts: En Banc Decisions in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 74 JUDICATURE 133, 134 (1990) (noting that on an en banc 
appellate court like the Supreme Court, a “dissenter can usually share the 
burden of opinion writing . . . and therefore more freely indicate his or her 
actual views on an issue”). 
91. See infra Table 4 (showing “percent conservative” which is the rate
of voting in support of government interests).  See supra notes 27-39 and 
accompanying text discussing the coding of votes and decisions as 
conservative or liberal. 
23
138 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:1
TABLE 4:  JUSTICES’ RATES OF AGREEING WITH ROBERTS OR 
KENNEDY IN NON-UNANIMOUS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISIONS, 
2005-2015 
Justice (n 
votes)92 
Percent 
conservative 
Percent in 
agreement 
with Roberts 
Percent in 
agreement 
with Kennedy 
Roberts (171) 69.6 --- 73.7
Kennedy 
(172) 55.8 73.7 ---
3 Other 
Conservatives, 
Mean93 
79.2 75.5 56.3
Alito 88.0 79.4 63.3
Thomas 82.6 69.6 51.2
Scalia 67.4 77.8 54.7
6 Liberals, 
Mean94 22.9 45.1 60.0
Breyer (171) 30.4 50.6 65.5
Souter (74) 23.0 41.1 54.1
Ginsburg 
(172) 20.9 42.1 58.1
Kagan (72) 20.8 45.8 66.7
Stevens (95) 20.0 37.2 54.7
Sotomayor 
(96) 17.7 51.0 58.3
The Chief Justice’s position in the conservative wing 
appears especially strong relative to that of Justice Kennedy 
with regard to garnering support from other conservative 
92. Justice O’Connor’s two votes in non-unanimous cases are not
included. 
93. Percentages for ‘3 Other Conservatives’ are weighted means and
reflect the Justices’ different participation rates over this period. 
94. Percentages for ‘6 Liberals’ are weighted means and reflect the
Justices’ different participation rates over this period. 
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Justices as indicated by the inter-agreement statistics.95  
Justices Alito, Thomas and Scalia each posted substantially 
higher agreement rates with the Chief Justice than with 
Justice Kennedy. 
In fact, Justice Kennedy was less likely, on average, to vote 
with Justices Alito, Thomas or Scalia than he was with a 
random Justice from the Court’s liberal wing.96  While this 
underscores the need to accommodate Justice Kennedy’s views 
to maintain a conservative majority in certain cases, it also 
ranks Chief Justice Roberts as clearly the more reliable 
conservative in criminal justice cases. 
Justice Kennedy’s most common ally in these cases—by a 
substantial margin—has been Chief Justice Roberts.  This 
heightens the importance of Chief Justice Roberts’s role while 
highlighting Justice Kennedy’s relative isolation from the rest 
of the conservative core.  Chief Justice Roberts is one of only 
two Justices to vote with Justice Kennedy in at least two-thirds 
of non-unanimous, criminal justice decisions; the other is 
Justice Kagan.97  Every Justice, other than Justice Kennedy, 
enjoys agreement rates with at least three other Justices that 
surpass the 67 percent level.98 
Chief Justice Roberts agrees most frequently with the 
Court’s most conservative member in criminal justice issues—
Justice Alito.  Justice Alito’s record differs significantly from 
that of Justice O’Connor, whom he replaced and who provided 
several critical swing votes in support of thin liberal majorities 
95. Decades of Court analyses have drawn upon inter-agreement tables
to illustrate shared voting patterns among Justices and to identify potential 
voting blocs.  See, e.g., GARRISON NELSON, PATHWAYS TO THE US SUPREME 
COURT: FROM THE ARENA TO THE MONASTERY 171-72 (2013) (noting The 
Harvard Review’s use of inter-agreement rates dating to the late 1940s in 
summarizing Supreme Court Terms, and C. Herman Pritchett’s pioneering 
work of the late 1930s on the related topic of bloc voting). 
96. Justice Kennedy agreed with Justices Scalia, Alito or Thomas 287
times in the 510 opportunities to do so in non-unanimous, criminal justice 
decisions (56.3 percent).  Justice Kennedy agreed with Justices Breyer, 
Souter, Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan or Stevens in 408 of 680 such chances 
(60.0 percent).  See supra Table 4. 
97. See supra Table 4.
98. Rates are based on the authors’ analysis of cases and votes selected.
See supra Part II (discussing case selection). 
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during the Rehnquist Court.99  Justice Alito voted for the 
liberal position in only twenty non-unanimous, criminal justice 
decisions in his first ten years on the Court, and only three 
times when a case produced at least three dissenters.100  
However, Chief Justice Roberts’s high rate of agreement with 
Justice Alito has not relegated the Chief Justice to the Court’s 
periphery.  Chief Justice Roberts also regularly voted with 
Justices Scalia and Thomas; this is significant because, in 
recent years, the grouping of Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas 
proved to be one of the Court’s strongest voting blocs in 
criminal justice cases.101 
In the decisions examined, Justices Scalia, Thomas and 
Alito ended on the same side of the vote count in nearly three 
of every four cases in which they all participated.  As shown in 
Table 5, Chief Justice Roberts was much more likely than 
Justice Kennedy to join the three other conservatives in these 
instances.  For example, in the 100 cases in which Justices 
Scalia, Alito and Thomas took a similar position with respect to 
judgment in a non-unanimous decision, Chief Justice Roberts 
99. See, e.g., Madhavi M. McCall, Sandra Day O’Connor: Influence from
the Middle of the Court, in THE REHNQUIST COURT, supra note 9, at 158-59; 
Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Court in Transition: The Overview; Bush 
Picks U.S. Appeals Judge to Take O’Connor’s Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, 
at A1 (noting that Alito’s arrival and O’Connor’s departure as a swing vote 
“could shift the balance of the [C]ourt and change the laws of the nation well 
into the century”); Smith & McCall, supra note 54, at 11; Martin et al., supra 
note 20, at 1291 (“[O]n virtually all conceptual and empirical definitions, 
O’Connor is the Court’s center—the median, the key, the critical and the 
swing Justice.”).  
100. Justice Alito voted with a five-member, liberal majority in Yates,
135 S. Ct. at 1074, and in Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 1, and in the six-to-three 
decision in Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).  In all three cases, Justice 
Alito and Chief Justice Roberts were in the majority, while Justice Kennedy 
dissented. 
101. See, e.g., Madhavi M. McCall, Michael A. McCall & Christopher E.
Smith, Criminal Justice and the 2011-2012 United States Supreme Court 
Term, 41 FL. COASTAL L. REV. 239, 249-50 (2013) (finding that the only 
grouping of Justices to agree sufficiently often in criminal justice cases that 
Term to meet the statistical threshold for being called a voting bloc consisted 
of Justices Scalia, Alito and Thomas); Christopher E. Smith, Michael A. 
McCall & Madhavi M. McCall, The Roberts Court and Criminal Justice at the 
Dawn of the 2008 Term, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 265, 273 (2009) (finding Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia to be the strongest 
voting bloc in criminal justice cases decided during the first four years of the 
Roberts Court). 
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joined them ninety-one times—or about 50 percent more often 
than did Kennedy (sixty-one times).  Chief Justice Roberts 
broke with a majority that included Justices Scalia, Alito and 
Thomas only twice in the 264 cases reviewed during the first 
decade of the Roberts Court era.  In one, Chief Justice Roberts 
dissented when the majority (which included all four remaining 
conservative Justices, along with Justices Ginsburg and 
Kagan) ruled against a defendant’s challenge to a pre-trial 
asset seizure.102  Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting 
opinion to assert that defendants have the right to challenge 
forfeiture, especially when those funds are intended to pay for 
legal counsel.103 
In the other case,104 the majority held that state courts 
could apply retroactively a court’s criminal procedure rule 
regarding the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
more broadly than precedent required.105  Chief Justice Roberts 
disagreed and argued that such issues of retroactivity should 
be decided by federal, rather than state, courts.106  
Interestingly, the only other dissenter in Danforth was Justice 
Kennedy and he joined the Chief Justice’s dissent.107  Thus, 
this case did not improve Justice Kennedy’s agreement rate 
with the three other conservatives relative to Chief Justice 
Roberts’s rate.  In short, Chief Justice Roberts was out of a 
single majority that included Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas 
and Alito in a criminal justice case decided during this 
period.108  In contrast, Justice Kennedy dissented seven times 
when all four of his fellow conservatives were in the 
majority.109 
102. Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014).
103. Id. at 1105 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
104. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
105. Id. at 267-68.
106. Id. at 291-92 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1090.
109. Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012); Wood v. Allen, 558
U.S. 290 (2010); Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010); Hemi Grp. v. City of 
New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); Irizarry 
v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
27
142 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:1
TABLE 5:  THE CONSERVATIVE BLOC, CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES 
2005-2015 
Type of Outcome 
Category / Grouping by number 
of cases in which: 
Non-
Unanimous 
All 
Roberts, Kennedy, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito participated 165 248
110 
Scalia, Thomas, Alito agreed 
with each other 100 183
And in the majority 69 152 
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas & Alito 
agreed  with each other 91 174
 And in the majority 67 150 
Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas & Alito 
agreed with each other 61 144
 And in the majority 61 144 
Percent Voting Together 
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas & Alito 55.2 % 70.2 % 
Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas & Alito  37.0 % 58.1 % 
An examination of voting behaviors across four dimensions 
in non-unanimous cases affords a more detailed, comparative 
assessment of members of the conservative wing, and of Chief 
Justice Roberts’s and Justice Kennedy’s relative placement 
110. Only four conservative Justices participated in sixteen of the
Court’s 264 cases criminal justice cases during this period.  Justice Alito did 
not participate in fifteen (including six cases decided when Justice O’Connor 
was still on the Court).  Chief Justice Roberts did not participate in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), in which Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas
agreed with each other, and disagreed with Justice Kennedy.
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within that camp.  These dimensions111 are scaled to focus on 
voting in the conservative wing and tap each Justice’s 
Consistency: Dependability to vote 
conservative as measured by the percent of a 
Justice’s votes favoring law enforcement 
interests; 
Efficiency: Likelihood that a Justice’s 
conservative vote will be endorsed by the Court 
as measured by the percent of a Justice’s 
conservative votes that fell in the majority; 
Gravity: Ability to attract support from other 
conservative Justices as measured by the 
weighted mean percent agreement with the other 
conservative Justices; and 
Criticality: Dependability to cast a crucial 
conservative vote in cases decided by a five-
member majority as measured by the percent of 
a Justice’s votes favoring law enforcement 
interests in such cases. 
The findings presented in Table 6 expose the vast distance 
between Chief Justice Roberts’s position in the conservative 
wing from that occupied by Justice Kennedy.  While Chief 
Justice Roberts ranks as the median conservative in criminal 
justice cases, Justice Kennedy demonstrates why judicial 
scholars often label him the Court’s median Justice112 by 
posting the lowest conservative consistency score among the 
111. Gravity scores are similar to inter-agreement rates but with
respect to all members of the conservative wing.  See supra Table 4.  The 
efficiency measure gauges the efficiency of conservative votes only. 
Consistency scores are presented elsewhere in this Article as “percent 
conservative.”  Calculations for the criticality dimension regard voting only in 
those seventy cases ending five-to-four or five-to-three.  Other dimensions 
regard voting in 172 criminal justice cases decided by a non-unanimous Court 
from the 2005-2006 Term through the 2014-2015 Term. 
112. See, e.g., HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY 4 (2009) (“[T]here is no escaping the fact 
that for most of his two decades on the Supreme Court Kennedy has been the 
model of a median justice.”). 
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five members of the dominant, conservative wing.113 
However, Justice Kennedy has been extraordinarily 
efficient in his support of law enforcement interests in that few 
of his conservative votes in these cases have been in dissent. 
Indeed, five of every six conservative votes cast by Justice 
Kennedy in non-unanimous, criminal justice decisions during 
the last ten Terms were with the majority.114  This efficiency 
allowed Justice Kennedy to be a member of more conservative 
majorities in divided cases (eighty) than was Justice Thomas 
(seventy-eight) or Justice Scalia (seventy-one), despite Justices 
Thomas and Scalia voting conservative more often than Justice 
Kennedy.  Chief Justice Roberts ranks second in conservative 
voting efficiency among his fellow conservatives with about 69 
percent of his conservative votes in these cases supporting a 
majority.115  In contrast, over 40 percent of the conservative 
votes cast by Justices Alito and Thomas—the Court’s most 
consistent conservatives—placed these Justices in the 
minority.116 
113. Justice Kennedy cast twenty-three fewer conservative votes than
did Chief Justice Roberts (96 compared to 119) in these cases. 
114. Of Justice Kennedy’s ninety-six conservative votes in non-
unanimous, criminal justice cases during this period, eighty were with the 
majority. 
115. See infra Table 6 (showing rankings by efficiency of conservative
votes). 
116. Id.
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TABLE 6:  DIMENSIONS OF CONSERVATIVE VOTING IN NON-
UNANIMOUS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES, 2005-2015 
Ranked Scores on Dimensions of Conservative Voting117 
Consistency Efficiency 
Alito 88.0 Kennedy 83.3
Thomas 82.6 Roberts 68.9
Roberts 69.6 Scalia 61.2
Scalia 67.4 Alito 57.5
Kennedy 55.8 Thomas 54.9
Gravity Criticality
Roberts 75.1 Alito 97.0
Alito 71.8 Roberts 91.3
Scalia 70.0 Scalia 82.9
Thomas 68.6 Thomas 78.6
Kennedy 60.6 Kennedy 55.7
As noted previously, Chief Justice Roberts garnered far 
more support from Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito for his 
criminal justice positions than did Justice Kennedy.118  Indeed, 
inter-agreement rates in non-unanimous, criminal justice 
decisions suggest that no other member of the conservative 
wing possesses as much “gravitational pull” on his fellow 
conservatives as does Chief Justice Roberts.  At the other end 
of the spectrum, Justice Kennedy has been the least successful 
member of that wing in attracting the support of other 
conservatives, and his gravity score would be lower still if not 
for his relatively high agreement rate with the Chief Justice.119 
The most substantial gap between the voting behaviors of 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy emerges in the 
Court’s most divided decisions.  Chief Justice Roberts voted 
117. See supra note 100 and accompanying text for discussion of how
each measure is calculated. 
118. See supra Table 4.
119. Of the votes by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito in non-
unanimous, criminal justices cases decided during the first ten Terms of the 
Roberts Court era, 383 agreed with the positions on judgment taken by Chief 
Justice Roberts, while only 287 agreed with Justice Kennedy’s votes. 
Excluding the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy’s gravity score drops to 56.3. 
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liberal in only six120 of the sixty-nine criminal justice cases in 
which he participated that ended in a minimally-winning 
majority (conservative criticality score of 91.3); only Justice 
Alito proved more reliable in providing a critical fifth, 
conservative vote in the Court’s most divided criminal justice 
decisions from 2005-2015.121  In contrast, Justice Kennedy has 
been almost as likely to support liberal outcomes as 
conservative ones in criminal justice cases decided by a five-
member majority,122 making him unquestionably the least 
dependable member of the conservative wing in the Court’s 
most highly divided decisions.123 
It is reasonable to assume that, as the Court’s median 
Justice during this period,124 Justice Kennedy played a crucial 
role in the conservative bloc in ways not captured by the 
criticality dimension.  For example, one might argue that as 
the Justice who “mediates the liberal and conservative voting 
blocs”125 on this ideologically divided Court, Justice Kennedy 
may not support law enforcement interests as often as his 
fellow conservatives, but few conservative decisions arise 
120. Chief Justice Roberts voted with the liberal majority in Yates v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012); and in Hemi Grp. v. New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010). He also 
dissented from five-member, conservative majorities in Paroline v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2013); Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010); 
and in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009).  In each of these cases 
characterized by an unusual split among the Justices, Chief Justice Roberts 
voted with at least one other conservative Justice. 
121. See supra Table 6.  Both of Justice Alito’s pro-defendant votes in
criminal justice cases ending in five-member majorities involved somewhat 
unusual cases in this dataset in that the defendants represented commercial 
interests.  In Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015), the Court 
determined whether throwing undersized fish overboard constituted the 
destruction or concealment of a “tangible object” criminalized by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Hemi Grp. v. New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010) involved the 
attempt to collect taxes on cigarettes sold over the Internet. 
122. Justice Kennedy voted in favor of a liberal outcome in thirty-one of
seventy criminal justice cases decided by a five-member majority. 
123. See supra Table 6.
124. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential
Man in the Middle, WASH. POST (May 13, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/12/AR2007051201586.html.  
125. RYAN A. MALPHURS, RHETORIC AND DISCOURSE IN SUPREME COURT
ORAL ARGUMENTS: SENSEMAKING IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 98 (2013). 
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without Kennedy’s support.  The data sustains this assertion; 
from 2005-2015, the Court handed down only seven 
conservative criminal justice decisions without Kennedy’s 
conservative vote.126 
Even in this regard, however, Chief Justice Roberts ranks 
as more influential than Justice Kennedy.  The Court decided 
only five cases in favor of law enforcement interests during this 
period without Chief Justice Roberts in the conservative 
majority.127 
Thus, on virtually all measures Chief Justice Roberts has 
demonstrated himself to be more central to the conservative 
bloc in criminal justice cases than has Justice Kennedy, and a 
more dependable conservative vote, especially in the Court’s 
most divided decisions.  However, many of the Court’s split 
decisions produced liberal outcomes, and as discussed in the 
next section, it is in these cases that Justice Kennedy’s 
influence emerges most noticeably. 
V. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY
A. Justice Kennedy & Liberal Outcomes
The tendency of observers to concentrate on the influence 
of Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts is not surprising, 
given the frequency in which Court decisions align with these 
Justices’ positions.  Not only are Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kennedy among the most likely Justices to be in the 
majority in criminal justice decisions, they also are the only 
members of the Court to have joined more than half of all 
liberal, non-unanimous majorities and more than half of all 
conservative ones over the first ten Terms of the Roberts Court 
126. Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012); Camreta v. Greene,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010); Barber v. 
Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010); Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290 (2010); Irizarry v. 
United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006). 
127. Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014); Paroline v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2013); Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010); 
United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009); Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 
(2009).  Justice Kennedy joined Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Dolan, 560 
U.S. at 621.  
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era, as summarized in Table 7. 
TABLE 7:  SWING AND MAJORITY VOTING IN NON-UNANIMOUS, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISIONS, BY JUSTICE AND MAJORITY TYPE, 
2005-2015128 
Justice 
(votes) 
% in 
Majority 
% in 
Conservative 
Majority 
% in 
Liberal 
Majority 
% in 5-
Member 
Majority 
Swing 
Votes 
Kennedy 
(172) 86.6 92.0 81.2 82.9 29 
Kagan  (72) 76.4 46.7 97.6 65.6 1 
Roberts 
(171) 75.4 94.3 56.0 44.9 3 
Sotomayor 
(96) 71.9 38.6 100.0 63.2 1 
Breyer 
(171) 67.3 47.7 87.1 55.7 7 
Ginsburg 
(172) 65.7 36.8 95.3 58.6 3 
Scalia 
(172) 64.5 81.6 47.1 47.1 9 
Souter (74) 63.5 38.1 96.9 51.6 1 
Alito (166) 62.7 100.0 24.4 47.8 2 
Thomas 
(172) 57.6 89.7 24.7 51.4 8 
128. Swing votes are those from a member of the conservative wing that
help produce a five-member liberal majority, and those from a member of the 
liberal wing that help produce a five-member conservative majority.  More 
than one Justice can cast a swing vote in a given case.  See, e.g., Smith & 
McCall, supra note 54, at 10-12 (“Here ‘swing votes’ in criminal justice cases 
are defined as individual justices’ outcome-determining votes in 5 to 4 
decisions that deviated from the ‘expected vote.’  The expected vote in each 
case is defined as the five justices with the most conservative lifetime voting 
records in criminal justice cases lining up against the four most liberal 
lifetime voters . . . .”).  Justice O’Connor (not shown in Table 7) did not 
provide a swing vote in either of the two non-unanimous, criminal justice 
decisions by the Roberts Court in which she participated.  Percentages reflect 
only those cases in which a given Justice participated. 
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Stevens 
(95) 56.8 29.6 92.7 50.0 2 
N 
Majorities 172 87 85 70 66
Justice Kennedy, however, played a far more instrumental 
role than Chief Justice Roberts in producing the Court’s liberal 
decisions.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy was part of more majorities 
generating liberal, non-unanimous decisions (sixty-nine of 
eighty-five) during this period than were Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Thomas combined,129 and in almost as many as 
Justice Breyer,130 whom legal commentators and scholars 
depict as a key member of the liberal bloc.131 
Because of Justice Kennedy’s routine presence in both 
liberal and conservative majorities (in criminal justice and in 
other types of cases), advocates and fellow Justices often seek 
his crucial vote.132  The importance of Justice Kennedy’s 
support in explaining case outcomes has prompted some 
129. Chief Justice Roberts was in forty-seven majorities in these cases,
while Justice Thomas was in twenty-one.  Chief Justice Roberts did not 
participate in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).   
130. Justice Breyer was in seventy-four liberal, non-unanimous
majorities. 
131. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, MADHAVI MCCALL & CYNTHIA
PEREZ MCCLUSKEY, LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 30 (2005) (finding through statistical analysis that 
the liberal bloc in criminal justice cases from 1995-2002 included Justices 
Breyer, Souter and Ginsburg); Jeffrey Toobin, Without a Paddle: Can Stephen 
Breyer Save the Obama Agenda in the Supreme Court?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 
27, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/09/27/without-a-paddle 
(characterizing the liberal wing with Justice Stevens’ retirement as: 
“Ginsburg is a loner; Sotomayor and Kagan are new.  On this day, Breyer led 
the left, as he likely will for years to come”).  
132. See, e.g., MALPHURS, supra note 125, at 98 (describing Justice
Kennedy as “one of the most important justices on the Court” whose support 
is often the focus of attorneys and fellow Justices during oral arguments); 
Richard Wolf, From Gay Marriage to Voting Law, Kennedy is the Key, USA 
TODAY, June 27, 2013, 11:31 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/27/supreme-court-
athony-kennedy-race-voting-abortion-gay-marriage/2161701/ (describing how 
Justice Kennedy is perceived by advocates and others as having the decisive 
vote on various questions facing the Court as indicated by, among other 
things, the frequent mention of Justice Kennedy by name in amicus briefs 
filed with the Supreme Court). 
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judicial experts to dub him a “super median” Justice.133  Such 
Justices are considered “so powerful that they are able to 
exercise significant control over the outcome and content of the 
Court’s decisions.”134  This title is particularly apt in the area of 
criminal justice, given the large number of such cases decided 
by the narrowest of margins, and because many of those five-
to-four decisions have ended in liberal rulings. 
Indeed, many of Justice Kennedy’s liberal votes were 
decisive, “swing votes”—votes that helped produce minimally-
winning coalitions favoring the claims of the criminally accused 
or convicted.135  On the recent Court, swing votes typically 
arose when a conservative Justice (and most commonly, Justice 
Kennedy) joined the four members of the liberal wing, though 
swing votes occurred in other configurations, and some were 
cast by liberal Justices.136  Scholars frequently emphasize the 
importance of the swing vote and the often-related median vote 
when using rational choice and other jurisprudential theories 
to explain or predict Court interpretations.137  As the label 
133. Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37,
67 (2008) (identifying Justice Kennedy as one of five super median Justices 
since the beginning of the Warren Court era). 
134. Id. at 37.
135. For our operationalization of the term swing vote, see supra note
128 and accompanying text. 
136. During the first ten Terms of the Roberts Court, for a liberal
Justice to cast a swing vote, at least one of the five conservative Justices 
would have had to dissent or not participate.  On some occasions, more than 
one Justice from the conservative wing dissented from a minimally-winning 
majority that nevertheless produced a conservative outcome.  Consequently, 
there were fifteen swing votes from liberal Justices in eight cases ending in a 
conservative ruling.  These cases (and swing votes) are: Navarette v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (Breyer); Paroline v. United States, 134 S. 
Ct. 1710 (2013) (Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 
1958 (2013) (Breyer); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (Breyer); 
Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010) (Breyer, Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor); Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (Ginsburg, Stevens and 
Breyer); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008) (Stevens); and James 
v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (Souter and Breyer).
137. See, e.g., Martin et al., supra note 20 (presenting a new method for
assessing median voters and using this approach to assess whether Justice 
O’Connor moved to the left during her career, and the likelihood that 
President George W. Bush would be able to shift dramatically the direction of 
the Court); Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75(4) J.
OF POLIT. 1089 (2011) (asserting that the median and swing vote are not 
necessarily the same, and identifying conditions when the swing vote Justice 
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suggests, the swing vote determines which faction prevails and 
which interpretation becomes law. 
In this regard, Justice Kennedy’s power on the Court in 
the area of criminal justice currently has been without equal. 
He provided far more swing votes (twenty-nine) in such cases 
during the first ten Terms of the Roberts Court than any other 
Justice, and more than his four fellow conservatives 
combined.138  Chief Justice Roberts served as a swing vote only 
three times,139 and in one of these cases, he joined an opinion 
written by Justice Kennedy who ruled that key sections of 
Arizona’s immigration law were preempted by federal law.140 
Narrowing the analytical lens to those split decisions 
driven by a single, swing vote accentuates Justice Kennedy’s 
dominance as the Court’s median Justice.  Justice Kennedy 
supplied the swing vote in twenty-seven of the thirty-three 
may be motivated more by strategic than attitudinal considerations); Mario 
Bergara, Barak Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court 
Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 
247 (2003) (using median-Justice theory to demonstrate strategic decision 
making by the Court when confronted with institutional constraints from the 
legislative branch); R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Swing Votes on the 
Current Supreme Court: The Joint Opinion in Casey and Its Progeny, 29 
PEPP. L. REV. 637 (2002) (analyzing five-to-four decisions of the 1990s to posit 
that differences among Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter on 
dimensions of natural law help explain voting differences between these 
three pivotal voters despite sharing a basic decision-making philosophy); 
Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of 
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 28, 41-42 (1997) (using median 
positions on the Court and advocating for other policy players to test the 
separation-of-powers model, asserting Justices typically vote their sincere 
preferences). 
138. See supra Table 7 (showing that Justice Kennedy cast twenty-nine
swing votes while Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and 
Alito collectively accounted for twenty-two). 
139. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (ending in an
unusual majority including Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, 
Sotomayor and Ginsburg); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) 
(ending in a five-to-three decision in which Justice Kagan did not participate, 
and in which Justices Scalia, Alito and Thomas dissented); Hemi Group v. 
New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010) (finding that the city did not substantiate a 
RICO claim in a case involving online sales of cigarettes) (Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote for an unusual majority for a liberal decision that included 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Ginsburg; Justices Breyer, Stevens and 
Kennedy dissented, while Justice Sotomayor did not participate.). 
140. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492.
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criminal justice cases decided by a five-member majority that 
included such a sole defection.141  The only six other singular, 
swing votes were cast by Justices Breyer (three),142 Scalia,143 
Thomas144 and Stevens.145  Justice Kennedy’s unchallenged role 
as the swing vote explains why he has been part of far more 
five-member majorities in cases raising criminal justice issues 
than any other Justice on the Roberts Court.  Conversely, of 
the eleven members who have served on the Court during the 
last decade,146 Chief Justice Roberts has been the Justice most 
likely to be on the losing side when a criminal justice case ends 
in a five-member majority.147 
As shown in Table 8, the previously noted advantage 
enjoyed by Chief Justice Roberts over Justice Kennedy of being 
in more conservative majorities148 evaporates in the context of 
these highly-divided decisions.  Not only did Justice Kennedy 
join one more fragile majority producing a conservative 
outcome than did Chief Justice Roberts,149 he also was a 
141. See infra notes 155-164 (listing these cases in which Justice
Kennedy supplied the sole swing vote). 
142. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683 (holding that a traffic stop in which
the officer reasonably suspected drunk driving based on the totality of 
circumstances including an anonymous tip did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment); King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (holding that it is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment to take without a warrant a cheek swab for DNA 
analysis of someone held in custody after being arrested for a serious offense); 
William, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (holding that it does not violate the Confrontation 
Clause for testimony about DNA results to be given by experts who did not 
perform the test). 
143. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (upholding
the right to counsel of choice). 
144. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (holding that any
findings that increase the mandatory minimum sentence of a crime must be 
found by a jury and not by a judge alone). 
145. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008) (holding that Rule
32(h) does not apply to a variance from the recommended sentencing 
guideline range). 
146. Again, we exclude Justice O’Connor’s limited number of votes
during this period. 
147. See supra Table 7 (showing that Chief Justice Roberts was part of
about 45 percent of such majorities in cases in which he participated, while 
Justice Kennedy posted the Court’s highest rate of inclusion in five-member 
majorities at 83 percent). 
148. See supra Table 7.
149. Of the thirty-one marginally winning majorities producing a
conservative decision in a criminal justice case during this period, Justice 
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member of twenty-nine minimal majorities ruling in a liberal 
direction, while Chief Justice Roberts was in only three such 
majorities.150  Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s four most 
liberal Justices against all his fellow conservatives151 in all but 
two of the five-member liberal majorities of which he was a 
part.152 
Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts both dissented in Dolan v. United States, 
560 U.S. 605 (2010).  Justice Kennedy also dissented in Irizarry, 553 U.S. 
708, while Chief Justice Roberts dissented in Paroline v. United States, 134 
S. Ct. 1710 (2013), and in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009).
150. See supra note 139 (identifying Chief Justice Roberts’s three swing
votes). 
151. Three of these cases ended five-to-three.  Justice Kennedy voted
with the liberal wing and against the three other participating members of 
the conservative wing in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (Justice Alito did 
not participate); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (Justice Alito did 
not participate); and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (Chief Justice 
Roberts did not participate). 
152. The two outliers are Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)
(ruling that involuntary blood draws during drunk driving investigations are 
searches and do not automatically qualify as exigency exceptions to the 
warrant requirement; the majority included Justices Kennedy, Scalia, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan); and Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (ruling key sections of Arizona’s immigration law were 
preempted by federal law; the majority included Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor; Justice Kagan did not 
participate in this case). 
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TABLE 8: OUTCOME-DETERMINING VOTES153 BY JUSTICE, IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES, 2005-2015 
Outcome-Determining Votes
Justice       
(all votes) Total Conservative Liberal 
As a % 
of 
Justices 
Total 
Votes 
Kennedy 
(264) 58 29 29 22.0
Kagan (111) 21 1 20 18.9 
Sotomayor 
(151) 24 1 23 15.9
Ginsburg 
(264) 41 3 38 15.5
Breyer (263) 39 7 32 14.8 
Souter (111) 16 1 15 14.4 
Thomas (264) 36 28 8 13.6 
Stevens (140) 18 2 16 12.9 
Alito (249) 32 30 2 12.9 
Scalia (264) 33 24 9 12.5 
Roberts 
(263) 31 28 3 11.8
Totals 
(2,350) 350 155 195 14.9 
153. Outcome-determining votes are those in which the liberal-
conservative direction of the outcome would change if a given Justice voted 
differently.  Positions taken by other Justices are assumed fixed. 
Consideration of outcome regards the direction of judgment only.  The Court 
handed down seventy such criminal justice decisions during the ten Terms 
reviewed.  Included in the totals, but not shown separately, are Justice 
O’Connor’s six criminal justice votes on the Roberts Court, including one 
outcome-determining vote in which she joined the conservative, five-member 
majority in Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006). 
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That is, in twenty-seven cases Justice Kennedy provided 
the pivotal, lone swing vote that determined the outcome in 
favor of the criminally accused or convicted.154  In these cases, 
Justice Kennedy and the Court limited the application of the 
death penalty155 and preserved other Eighth Amendment 
protections,156 made claims regarding police use of excessive 
force easier to demonstrate,157 supported certain claims of 
actual innocence as a gateway to federal review,158 expanded 
Miranda protections,159 clarified detainee jurisprudence and 
the rights of enemy combatants,160 expanded the right to 
154. See infra notes 155-164 (listing these twenty-seven cases).
155. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015) (finding that the
defendant was entitled to have his Atkins claim considered on its merits in 
federal court); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (ruling that the state 
had created an unacceptable risk of executing those with intellectual 
disabilities); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that 
imposing the death penalty for the crime of child rape is unconstitutional); 
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (barring the execution of 
prisoners who do not have a rational understanding of the reason for their 
execution); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007) (ruling that the 
state’s jury instructions for capital sentencing did not allow jurors to give full 
consideration and effect to mitigating evidence); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 
U.S. 286 (2007) (finding that the state appeals court erred in its application 
of federal law when that court denied relief after finding the state capital 
sentencing statute prevented the jury from meaningfully considering relevant 
mitigating evidence); Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007) (finding the state 
court erred by requiring a standard of egregious harm when it evaluated 
whether an unconstitutional jury instruction invalidated a death sentence). 
156. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (ruling mandatory life
sentences without possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juvenile 
offenders); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (ruling a court-mandated 
population limit was necessary to remedy a violation of prisoners’ 
constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment). 
157. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
158. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013); House v. Bell, 547
U.S. 518 (2006). 
159. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding age is an
appropriate factor to consider in determining police custody, and that 
juvenile suspects may be entitled to a more protective approach to Miranda 
warnings that considers their less-developed ability to understand the 
context of police interrogations). 
160. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that detainees
at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba are entitled to the writ of 
habeas corpus and other constitutional rights); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006) (ruling that procedures established for military commissions 
to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay violated the Uniform Code of Military 
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effective counsel161 and related protections,162 limited the 
definition of consent searches,163 and voted in a rights-
protective fashion in other contexts.164  Thus, in over two-thirds 
of the Court’s highly divided, liberal decisions,165 Justice 
Justice and the Geneva Conventions). 
161. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (finding an inmate can
make an ineffective counsel claim for the first time in a federal habeas 
petition in this instance because state rules made it virtually impossible for 
him to raise that issue during an appeal in state court); Missouri v. Frye, 132 
S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (holding defense counsel is obligated to communicate to the
defendant formal plea offers from the prosecutor that may be favorable to the
defendant); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (establishing a remedy
for when ineffective counsel leads to the rejection of a plea agreement and a
subsequent trial that ended in a conviction and a sentence much harsher
than the defendant likely would have had under the plea agreement offer).
162. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (holding that while states
are not automatically required to provide counsel to indigent defendants in 
civil contempt cases such as those involving child support, states must have 
alternative safeguards in place to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
liberty); United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009) (finding a military 
appellate court has jurisdiction to consider a petition for writ of error coram 
nobis challenging a much earlier conviction that threatened to lead to the 
respondent’s deportation; the respondent claimed his counsel during the 
original plea bargaining was ineffective for failing to consider adequately the 
respondent’s concerns about deportation). 
163. Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (limiting
administrative searches of information regarding hotel patrons); Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (holding police do not have the authority to 
search of a house where one resident consents to the search while another 
resident is present and objects). 
164. See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013) (holding
that sentencing a defendant based on federal guidelines set forth after the 
defendant committed the crime—when the new guidelines provide for a 
higher sentencing range than the version at the time of the offense—violates 
the Ex Post Facto Clause); Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) 
(finding that reduced mandatory minimum sentences under the Fair 
Sentencing Act apply to defendants who committed their offense before, but 
were sentenced after, the Act was passed); Freeman v. United States, 131 S. 
Ct. 2685 (2011) (finding a sentence based on a plea agreement is subject to 
retroactive reduction given changes in sentencing guidelines); Corley v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 330 (2009) (holding that even voluntary confessions 
are generally inadmissible if the period of detention in which they are made 
violates the prompt presentment requirement); Abramski v. United States, 
134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014) (upholding the conviction of a gun buyer who falsely 
claimed he was purchasing the gun for himself). 
165. Justice Kennedy joined members of the liberal wing to produce
twenty-seven of the thirty-nine liberal rulings (69 percent) ending with five-
member majorities in criminal justice cases decided during the first ten 
Terms of the Roberts Court. 
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Kennedy provided the decisive vote as the only member of the 
conservative wing to affirm individual rights.166 
In short, no Justice during the Roberts Court era to date 
has cast as many pivotal, outcome-determining votes in 
criminal justice cases as Anthony Kennedy.167  Moreover, 
unlike those of all of his colleagues, Justice Kennedy’s votes in 
these instances have been split equally between supporting the 
interests of law enforcement and supporting the interests of 
defendants and prisoners.168 
These tendencies place Justice Kennedy among the most 
common members of the Court’s majority in criminal justice 
and other169 cases.  They also help explain why the Roberts 
Court through the 2014-2015 Term—dominated by five 
conservative members—produced an otherwise surprisingly 
large number of decisions favoring the criminally accused, 
especially in cases that most divided the Court.170  Through his 
willingness to support individual claims regarding the death 
penalty, the right to counsel and other matters, Justice 
Kennedy has been instrumental in making the Supreme 
Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence less monolithic and its 
rulings less predictable. 
166. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text regarding the
treatment of the rights-affirming cases of District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), and 
regarding the treatment of the rights-restricting decision in Abramski v. 
United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014). 
167. See supra Table 8 (showing that Justice Kennedy provided a total
of fifty-eight outcome-determining votes, followed by Justice Ginsburg at 
forty-one). 
168. See supra Table 8 (showing that while Justice Kennedy voted with
twenty-nine conservative and twenty-nine liberal majorities in highly divided 
cases, the distributions for each of the other Justices in criminal justice cases 
during this period is heavily skewed toward either liberal or conservative 
outcomes). 
169. See, e.g., Memorandum, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, End-of-Term
Statistical Analysis—October Term 2012, at 5 (June 29, 2013), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Summary_Memo_OT12.pdf  (“Justice Kennedy is, 
for the fifth consecutive Term, the Justice most likely to appear in the 
majority.”). 
170. See supra Table 1.
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B. Justice Kennedy as the Frequent Voice of the
Court 
Several of the previously discussed voting patterns predict 
that Justice Kennedy might play a prominent role in authoring 
the Court’s criminal justice opinions.  For example, as the 
median Justice171 who is usually in the majority,172 Justice 
Kennedy often provides a critical vote173 on a divided Court174 
that produces a large percentage of highly divided decisions.175  
It is reasonable to assume that others on the Court might seek 
to attract Justice Kennedy’s support in order to forge or 
maintain a majority by offering him the opportunity to author 
the Court’s majority opinion.176 
Analysis of opinion authorship in non-unanimous, criminal 
justice cases decided during the first ten Terms of the Roberts 
Court supports this hypothesis.  Findings, as summarized in 
Table 9, reveal that Justice Kennedy has been by far the most 
frequent writer of such opinions.  He wrote substantially more 
non-unanimous liberal decisions during this period than any 
other Justice.177  While Justice Kennedy wrote fewer non-
unanimous conservative decisions, he still authored almost as 
many as Justice Scalia, who was considered a leading legal 
voice of the conservative movement.178 
171. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
172. See supra Table 7.
173. See supra Part V.A.
174. See supra Part III.B.
175. See supra Table 1.
176. See, e.g., DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS, ch. 5 (10th ed. 2014) (reviewing various strategic 
considerations in assigning the task of opinion writing, including assigning 
the Justice closest to the Court’s middle in order to maintain support from 
those members who may have the weakest commitment to the majority’s 
position); FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: 
THE COLLEGIAL GAME 101 (2000) (noting the value of assigning the majority 
opinion to the median Justice to gain the critical, fifth vote, at least in 
minimally-winning majorities); Rohde, supra note 75. 
177. See infra Table 9.  Justice Kennedy wrote the liberal opinion for a
non-unanimous Court in eighteen of the sixty-nine such majorities in which 
he participated.  This rate (26.1 percent) nearly matches that by Justice 
Stevens (26.3 percent; ten of thirty-eight). 
178. See, e.g., BRISBIN, supra note 31; Liptak, supra note 15; Tony
Mauro, Justice Scalia, Leader of the Court’s Conservative Wing, Dies at 79, 
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The mathematically expected number of majority opinions 
authored (denoted E[M] in Table 9) by a given Justice is 
calculated by summing the probabilities of that Justice writing 
for the Court in each majority of which she was a member.179  
For example, a Justice who was part of a six-member majority 
and a five-member majority randomly would be expected to 
author 0.37 majority opinions (1/6 + 1/5).  Justice Kennedy, 
who authored twenty-seven of the Court’s non-unanimous, 
criminal justice rulings, exceeded his expected number by over 
two opinions.  Justice Stevens is the only member of the 
Roberts Court other than Justice Kennedy to write at least two 
more non-unanimous majority opinions than predicted.180  As 
the most senior member of the liberal bloc, Justice Stevens self-
assigned half of his liberal, non-unanimous majority opinions 
in criminal justice cases decided by the Roberts Court.181 
NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 13, 2016, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202749702587/Justice-Antonin-
Scalia-Leader-of-Courts-Conservative-Wing-Dies-at-79.  
179. Analyses in this section are of non-unanimous, criminal justice
decisions only. 
180. See infra Table 9.
181. Justice Stevens authored ten liberal, non-unanimous, criminal
justice decisions during this period.  In five of these cases, Chief Justice 
Roberts dissented or did not participate, and Justice Stevens was the most 
senior member of the majority.  Those five are: Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 
(2009); Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008); Brewer v. Quarterman, 
550 U.S. 286 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); and 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  See supra note 66 and 
accompanying text regarding assumptions about opinion assignments when 
the Chief Justice is not in the majority. 
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TABLE 9: NON-UNANIMOUS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MAJORITY 
OPINIONS AUTHORED AND OPINION AUTHORSHIP RATIO BY 
JUSTICE, 2005-2015 
Number of majority opinions authored 
Justice Total Liberal Conserv. Five-Member E[M]
182 OAR183 
Kennedy 27 18 9 19 24.95 1.082 
Scalia 19 9 10 8 18.06 1.052 
Breyer 19 9 10 5 18.81 1.010 
Alito 17 1 16 7 16.94 1.003 
Ginsburg 17 11 6 4 18.61 0.913 
Roberts 17 4 13 4 20.69 0.821 
Thomas 15 3 12 9 16.57 0.905 
Stevens 14 10 4 5 8.80 1.590 
Sotomayor 13 10 3 5 11.39 1.141 
Kagan 8 5 3 2 9.15 0.875 
Souter 6 5 1 2 7.66 0.783 
Totals 172 85 87 70 172 
To ease comparison, an Opinion Authorship Ratio (OAR) is 
calculated for each member of the Court by dividing the actual 
number of majority opinions authored by the expected number 
of opinions authored for each Justice.184  An OAR over 1.0 
182. E[M] is the expected number of majority opinions authored based
upon the number and size of majorities of which a given Justice was a 
member.  E[M] equals the sum of probabilities of writing each majority 
opinion.  The probability of writing a given decision, if the Justice is in the 
majority, equals one divided by the number of majority members; if the 
Justice dissents, the probability is zero.  Justice O’Connor did not write the 
majority opinion in any non-unanimous, criminal justice case in which she 
participated during this period.  Her expected number of authored majorities 
(not shown separately in Table 9 but included in the total E[M]) is 0.37. 
183. OAR (Opinion Authorship Ratio) equals the number of actual
majority opinions authored by a given Justice divided by the expected 
number for that Justice.  For Table 9 then, OAR = TOTAL / E[M]. 
184. The traditional OAR measure is “Majority Assignment Ratio” and
reflects scholars’ typical interest in how Chief Justices assign opinions for 
majorities in which they are members.  See, e.g., Wood et al., supra note 68; 
Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 67; Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb II, 
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indicates that a Justice penned a disproportionate number of 
majority opinions, while a lower ratio signifies that a Justice 
authored fewer opinions than one would expect given her 
participation rates in majorities of different sizes. 
Scholars have constructed and used such OAR metrics in 
various ways.  Our version possesses the advantage of 
acknowledging that the probability of writing the majority 
opinion depends on the size of the majority.185 
None of the Justices serving during the entire period 
analyzed posted a higher OAR in criminal justice cases than 
did Justice Kennedy.186  The authorship ratios for Justices 
Stevens and Sotomayor (both high)—as well as those for 
Justices Souter and Kagan (both low)—are sensitive to the 
lower number of cases in which each of these Justices 
participated. 
The rates of non-unanimous opinion writing in criminal 
justice cases for most other Justices are relatively in line with 
expectations, except for Chief Justice Roberts.  Chief Justice 
Roberts, whose majority opinion production is nearly four short 
of expectations, has the lowest OAR among current members of 
the Court with respect to these criminal justice decisions.187  
Chief Justice Roberts seems to focus his writing efforts in 
criminal justice cases more on important unanimous 
Freshman Opinion Writing on the U.S. Supreme Court, 1921-1991, 76
JUDICATURE 239 (1993); Brenner, supra note 67.  The measure and its label 
are changed slightly for this Article given the focus on authorship regardless 
of assigner.   
185. It is not uncommon for others simply to use the percentage of time
that a Justice is assigned the majority opinion when she is in the majority, 
without respect to whether that majority has nine members or five.  See Saul 
Brenner, Measuring Policy Leadership on the U.S. Supreme Court: A Focus 
on Majority Opinion Authorship, in STUDIES IN U.S. SUPREME COURT 
BEHAVIOR 136 (Harold J. Spaeth & Saul Brenner ed., 1990) (noting related 
limitations of typical constructions and applications of the OAR measure). 
186. Justice Kennedy’s Opinion Authorship Ratio in criminal justice
cases was considerably higher prior to the 2014-2015 Term (OAR = 1.17). 
That year, Justice Kennedy did not write a single non-unanimous, criminal 
justice opinion for the Court.  In each of the preceding nine Terms, Justice 
Kennedy authored at least two and as many as six such opinions.   
187. See supra Table 9.  The gap between the number of actual (17) and
expected (20.69) non-unanimous opinions authored by Roberts is also the 
largest on the Court.   
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decisions188 and on the occasional dissent.189  In recent years, 
many of Chief Justice Roberts’s most notable opinions have 
addressed issues not related directly to criminal justice, such 
as voting rights,190 the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act191 and political contributions.192  This serves as an 
important reminder that the comparisons in Table 9 regard 
non-unanimous, criminal justice cases only. 
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, tends to author 
multiple non-unanimous, criminal justice decisions for the 
Court each Term, and has been an especially prolific author of 
the Court’s most divided decisions.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy 
wrote more criminal justice decisions for a five-member 
majority during the first decade of the Roberts Court (nineteen) 
than did Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Souter, and Kagan combined (seventeen).193  Of the decisions 
written by Justice Kennedy for five-member majorities, twelve 
favored the rights of the convicted or criminally accused.194  Put 
differently, Justice Kennedy authored nearly one-third of all 
liberal criminal justice decisions from 2005-2015 that ended in 
a marginally-winning coalition.195 
188. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (ruling a
state law prohibiting most people from standing within a set distance from 
abortion clinics violates the First Amendment); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473 (2014) (holding that a lawful arrest generally does not permit police to 
search the cellphone of an arrested individual without a warrant); Bond v. 
United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (finding that the types of offenses in an 
act implementing an international treaty were not applicable to the criminal 
behavior in this case); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (regarding 
exigent circumstances and the warrant requirement). 
189. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
190. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
191. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
192. McCutcheon v. F.E.C., 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
193. See supra Table 9.
194. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 
(2011); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011); United States v. Denedo, 556 
U.S. 904 (2009); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); 
Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006). 
195. See supra Table 1 (showing that five-member majorities decided
thirty-nine cases in a liberal direction during this period). 
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Chief Justice Roberts assigned only one of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinions for a five-member, liberal majority.  In 
Arizona v. United States,196 the majority struck down 
provisions in a state law that allowed police to arrest 
individuals for suspicion of being an illegal immigrant, 
requiring legal immigrants to carry registration documents and 
making it a crime for an undocumented immigrant to search 
for or hold a job in the state. 
Chief Justice Roberts did assign to Justice Kennedy six 
important, conservative decisions that split the Court five-to-
four.  In these decisions, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court 
to hold that the mere act of remaining silent was not, in itself, 
sufficient to imply that the suspect had invoked his Miranda 
rights;197 that officials may conduct suspicionless strip searches 
of individuals arrested for minor offenses before admitting 
those individuals to the general inmate population;198 and that 
certain types of post-arrest DNA collection practices are part of 
a reasonable, legitimate police booking procedure.199  Justice 
Kennedy also wrote for the conservative majorities that 
supported deference to trial court decisions regarding potential 
jurors in capital cases200 and found jury instructions about the 
consideration of mitigating evidence in a death penalty case to 
be sufficiently clear.201  In a case raising racial and religious 
profiling claims after the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
Justice Kennedy held that the plaintiff failed to provide 
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim of unlawful 
discrimination.202  In five of these six conservative opinions 
assigned by the Chief Justice, all members of the conservative 
wing voted in the majority, while all liberal Justices 
dissented.203 
196. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
197. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
198. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
199. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
200. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007).
201. Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006).
202. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
203. In the lone exception—King, 133 S. Ct. 1958—Justice Scalia
dissented and Justice Breyer joined the remaining conservative Justices in 
the majority. 
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Most of Justice Kennedy’s opinions for five-member 
majorities, however, produced liberal outcomes,204 and were not 
assigned by Chief Justice Roberts.205  In these decisions 
authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court limited the application 
of the death penalty,206 made it easier to challenge capital 
convictions207 and to make certain claims regarding ineffective 
counsel,208 eased the eligibility for sentence reduction in certain 
instances,209 upheld the right of detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
to habeas corpus,210 and ruled that the overcrowding of 
California prisons caused such violations to prisoners’ Eighth 
Amendment rights regarding adequate safety and health care 
that a court-ordered population limit was justified.211 
Justice Kennedy also authored several criminal justice 
decisions for larger non-unanimous majorities.212  Some 
204. See supra Table 9.
205. Chief Justice Roberts dissented from eleven of Justice Kennedy’s
liberal decisions for minimally-winning majorities.  Based on our 
assumptions regarding opinion assignments, see supra note 60 and 
accompanying text; five of Justice Kennedy’s liberal opinions for five-member 
majorities were self-assigned (Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); 
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 
(2012); Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011); Brown v. Plata, 131 
S. Ct. 1910 (2011)) and six were assigned by Justice Stevens (United States v.
Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008);
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.
930 (2007); Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518
(2006)).
206. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986; Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Panetti, 551
U.S. at 930. 
207. Smith, 550 U.S. at 297; House, 547 U.S. at 518.
208. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376; Denedo, 556 at
U.S. 904. 
209. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2685.
210. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723.
211. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
212. Justice Kennedy authored eight non-unanimous, criminal justice
decisions during this period for majorities larger than five-members.  In 
addition to the four noted in text, he authored the decisions in: Bailey v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (finding that the detention of a man 
away from his home while his apartment was being searched by police 
violated the Fourth Amendment); Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) 
(ruling that vehicle flight qualified in this case as a violent felony under the 
Armed Career Criminals Act); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) 
(clarifying that certain actions taken under duress do not automatically bar 
an applicant’s request for asylum); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 
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centered on issue areas common in Justice Kennedy’s other 
opinions.  For example, his seven-to-two decision for the Court 
in Martinez v. Ryan213 expanded the right of federal habeas 
review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  He also 
wrote for the Court to find that the sentencing of a juvenile 
offender to life without parole for a non-homicide crime violated 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments.214  Justice Kennedy, who has a reputation for 
being a strong defender of free speech principles,215 also 
authored the Court’s decision striking down as 
unconstitutional the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that 
criminalized making false statements about having been 
awarded the Medal of Honor and other military decorations.216  
In one of the first major cases decided by the Roberts Court,217 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority in Gonzales v. Oregon218 
holding that Attorney General Ashcroft lacked the authority to 
declare as illegitimate medical practices related to physician-
assisted suicide when such practices were sanctioned by state 
law.  Thus, throughout the Roberts Court era to date, Justice 
Kennedy has been a frequent author of important criminal 
justice decisions of the Court.219 
(2008) (holding magistrates may preside over voir dire and jury selection with 
consent of counsel despite lacking express consent of the defendant). 
213. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
214. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
215. See, e.g., KNOWLES, supra note 112; Ashutosh Bhagwat & Matthew
Struhar, Justice Kennedy’s Free Speech Jurisprudence: A Quantitative and 
Qualitative Analysis, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 167 (2013); Helen J. Knowles, 
What a Difference Five Years Haven’t Made: Justice Kennedy and the First 
Amendment, 2007-2012, 82 UMKC L. REV. 79 (2013); Schmidt & Yalof, supra 
note 20.  
216. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
217. See On the Issues: Significant Decisions of the Roberts Court,
WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/supreme-court-
roberts/roberts.html#2005 (last visited Nov. 20, 2016) (listing Gonzales v. 
Oregon as one of the five “Significant Cases” of the first Term of the Roberts 
Court). 
218. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 545 U.S. 243 (2006).
219. See supra note 186 and accompanying text regarding the absence
of such signed opinions by Justice Kennedy during the 2014-2015 Term. 
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VI. BRIEF COMMENT ON THE POSSIBLE
IMPLICATIONS OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S DEATH ON
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S AND JUSTICE 
KENNEDY’S POWER BASES 
Justice Scalia was the longest serving member of the most 
recent Court220 and the intellectual leader of its conservative 
wing.221  His passing in February 2016 will profoundly affect 
the future direction of the Court in many ways, including a 
possible re-orientation away from its rightward tilt.222  As a 
result, the judicial vacancy immediately became embroiled in 
presidential and congressional politics.223 
During his last decade on the bench, Justice Scalia 
supported the interests of law enforcement twice as often as 
those of the criminal accused or convicted.224  Yet, Justice 
220. See supra note 8 (showing Scalia as the longest serving Justice of
the most recent Court). (click on View Text Version) (providing dates to 
calculate that Scalia’s near-thirty years on the Court ranks his tenure as the 
fifteenth longest in history; where relevant (e.g., Rehnquist), we combined 
years of service as Associate Justice and Chief Justice). 
221. Liptak, supra note 15; Mauro, supra note 178.
222. See, e.g., supra Table 2 (showing Scalia as one of the five Justices
who tended to vote conservative in criminal justice cases decided by the 
Roberts Court); See also Robert Barnes & Terri Rupar, Scalia’s death flips 
Supreme Court dynamics, hurts conservative hopes, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/scalias-death-
flips-supreme-court-dynamics-hurts-conservative-hopes/2016/02/14/b8f1f8ac-
d322-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) 
(reporting that the vacancy created by Scalia’s death has left the Court split 
four-to-four on certain issues until a replacement is confirmed). 
223. See, e.g., Sarah Kerman, Professors project impact of Scalia’s death
on upcoming election, THE CHRONICLE (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2016/02/160223-kerman-scalia-talk; 
Josh Lederman, After Scalia’s death, a constitutional clash with Congress, 
DENVER POST, (Feb. 20, 2016, 9:36 AM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_29541138/supreme-court-scuffle-triggering-
constitutional-clash; Mara Liasson, 5 Ways Scalia’s Death Complicates the 
2016 Election, NPR (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:22 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/16/466935651/5-ways-scalias-death-is-
complicating-the-2016-election; Kristina Peterson & Siobhan Hughes, Battle 
Lines Drawn in Congress Over Justice Antonin Scalia’s Successor, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, (Feb. 14, 2016, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/battle-lines-drawn-in-congress-over-justice-
antonin-scalias-successor-1455411187. 
224. See supra Table 2 (showing that Scalia voted conservative in 66.7
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Scalia’s “brand of constitutional interpretation, or textualism, 
sometimes led him to . . . join[] unusual coalitions of the 
justices in cases such as upholding free-speech rights of those 
with whom he disagreed, or siding with criminal defendants 
who challenged law enforcement techniques.”225 
While scholars undoubtedly will debate Justice Scalia’s 
criminal justice legacy for decades to come, certain likely 
implications of his departure on the spheres of influence 
occupied by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy seem 
clear.  For example, Chief Justice Roberts lost a powerful ally 
in criminal justice cases,226 as he and Justice Scalia often were 
among the Justices most likely to agree in a given Term’s 
criminal justice cases over the last decade.227  Indeed, Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia were the only conservative 
Justices to agree sufficiently often in such cases during the 
most recent Term to be considered a voting bloc.228  In contrast, 
Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia disagreed far more often 
and voted in a similar direction in only about five of every nine 
 
percent of the criminal justice cases analyzed). 
225.  Barnes, supra note 124; see also Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi 
M. McCall, Antonin Scalia: Outspoken & Influential Originalist, in THE 
REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 169, 175-76 (CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, 
CHRISTINA DEJONG & MICHAEL A. MCCALL, eds., 2011); DAVID A. SCHULTZ & 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN 
SCALIA (1996); Joanmarie Ilaria Divoli, Justice Scalia for the Defense? 40 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 4 (2011); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in 
Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of 
Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L. J. 183 (2005).  
226.  See supra Table 4 (showing that Chief Justice Roberts’s second 
highest inter-agreement score in cases analyzed was with Justice Scalia—
surpassed only by the Chief Justice’s slightly higher rate of agreement with 
Justice Alito). 
227.  See, e.g., Madhavi M. McCall, Michael A. McCall, & Christopher E. 
Smith, Criminal Justice and the 2013-2014 United States Supreme Court 
Term, 38 HAMLINE L. REV. 361, 372 (2015); Madhavi M. McCall, Michael A. 
McCall, & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 2010-2011 United 
States Supreme Court Term, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 307, 320 (2011); Michael A. 
McCall, Madhavi M. McCall, & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007-2008 Term, 36 S.U. L. REV. 33, 44 (2008); 
Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall, & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal 
Justice and the 2006-2007 United States Supreme Court Term, 76 UMKC L. 
REV. 993, 1000-01 (2008); Smith, McCall, & McCall, supra note 90, at 508.  
228.  Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, 
Criminal Justice and the 2014-2015 United States Supreme Court Term, 61 S. 
DAKOTA L. REV. 242, 254 (2016).  
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non-unanimous, criminal justice decisions since 2005.229  In his 
final year, Justice Scalia authored two non-unanimous, 
criminal justice decisions; the Chief Justice joined both while 
Justice Kennedy dissented from one,230 and filed a concurring 
opinion in the other in which he disagreed with Justice Scalia’s 
constitutional interpretation.231 
It seems probable that Justice Scalia’s successor will be 
ideologically more distant from Chief Justice Roberts than 
Justice Scalia was on many issues.  In opinion assignments, 
this new Justice would be a less attractive choice for Chief 
Justice Roberts through which to maximize the Chief Justice’s 
policy preferences than was Justice Scalia; Chief Justice 
Roberts frequently tapped Justice Scalia to write for the Court 
on criminal justice matters.232  Worse still for the Chief Justice, 
Justice Scalia’s replacement might regularly join the existing 
four-member liberal wing of the Court.  In that scenario, Chief 
Justice Roberts could face the choice in several future criminal 
justice cases of either supporting a liberal decision from which 
he might otherwise prefer to dissent, or relinquish the power to 
assign the Court’s opinion.  Chief Justice Roberts rarely had to 
do the latter when Justice Scalia was on the bench.233 
The potential implications of Justice Scalia’s departure are 
also significant concerning Justice Kennedy’s influence on the 
Court.  If Justice Scalia’s replacement is ideologically to the left 
of Justice Kennedy on criminal justice issues, Justice Kennedy 
will no longer represent the Court’s median Justice in these 
229. See supra Table 4.
230. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (holding that the residual clause of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague, demonstrating 
Justice Kennedy’s disagreement with Justice Scalia’s finding regarding the 
unconstitutionality of the ACCA, and expressing a fundamentally different 
logic that led to the same outcome as the majority).  
231. See Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793 (2015) (holding that a
petitioner may rely on a theory that was previously rejected by a lower court 
without having to file a cross-appeal or obtain a certificate of appealability). 
232. See supra Table 3 (showing that only Justice Alito received more
criminal justice opinion assignments from Roberts over the last decade than 
did Justice Scalia).  See supra note 66 and accompanying text (addressing 
assumptions concerning opinion assignments).   
233. See supra Table 2 (showing Chief Justice Roberts has voted with
the majority in 84 percent of criminal justice cases). 
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areas.  Instead, the newest member of the Court or Justice 
Breyer most likely would occupy that influential position,234 
and we would expect the frequency in which Justice Kennedy’s 
liberal votes determine the outcome of cases to decline 
sharply.235 
On a related but different base of power for Justice 
Kennedy, we also anticipate that such a reconfiguration of the 
Court will reduce the regularity in which Justice Kennedy 
writes for the liberal majority in criminal justice cases.236  
Although Justice Scalia’s seniority entitled him to assign 
opinions when in the majority without Chief Justice Roberts,237 
Justice Scalia’s departure will not diminish Justice Kennedy’s 
writing opportunities directly because Justice Scalia did not 
assign a single criminal justice opinion to Justice Kennedy 
during the entire Roberts Court era.238  Instead, the effect on 
Justice Kennedy’s opportunities to write liberal decisions will 
be indirect.  Namely, if Justice Scalia’s replacement routinely 
joins the liberal wing of the Court, Justice Kennedy’s vote will 
become less critical to those Justices who would then constitute 
a majority.  While Justice Kennedy could still self-assign 
opinions as the most senior member, assuming Chief Justice 
Roberts dissents,239 the hypothetical liberal majority 
presumably would be less inclined than in the past to 
compromise with Justice Kennedy to attract his vote.  The 
234. See supra Table 2 (ordering the Roberts Court Justices by their
tendency to vote conservative in criminal justice cases). 
235. See supra Table 8.
236. See supra Table 9.
237. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (regarding assumptions
about opinion assignments); see also supra note 220 and accompanying text 
(regarding Justice Scalia’s seniority). 
238. Justices Scalia and Kennedy were in the majority without Chief
Justice Roberts only twice in the 264 cases analyzed—that is, Justice Scalia 
had only two opportunities as the most senior Justice in the majority to 
assign Justice Kennedy the majority opinion.  Justice Sotomayor wrote for 
the Court in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), and Justice Kagan 
authored the decision in Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014). 
239. See, e.g., SCOTUS Seniority: U.S. Supreme Court Justices by Age
and Tenure, THREESTORY INSIGHTS, http://threestory.com/scotus/ (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2016) (showing Justice Kennedy as the longest serving Associate 
Justice currently on the Court); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text 
(regarding opinion assignment assumptions).  
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result could be five-to-four decisions that are more liberal in 
scope from which Justice Kennedy dissents. 
Of course, future voting patterns on the Court will depend 
in large part upon the ideological leanings and philosophical 
approaches of the next Justice, and on whether political battles 
will produce a confirmation under President Obama or force 
the judicial vacancy to continue until a new President presents 
his or her own nominee.240  At this juncture, none of those 
answers seem eminently clear. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In many ways, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy 
have established remarkably similar voting patterns in 
criminal justice cases.  They vote together with respect to 
judgment at a very high rate; indeed, the Chief Justice has 
been Justice Kennedy’s most common voting ally during the 
first decade of the Roberts Court era.241  Both have been on the 
winning side of nearly all criminal justice decisions producing a 
conservative outcome and, more generally, no Justice during 
the period reviewed has been a part of as many criminal justice 
majorities as has Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy.242  
The tendency among commentators when debating who leads 
the Court to focus on these two jurists seems justified. 
Yet, profound differences emerge from the examination of 
the Court’s decisions over the last ten Terms and do so in ways 
that illuminate the competing spheres of influence in criminal 
justice that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy have 
carved out.  The metrics used in this Article provide an initial 
sketch of these spheres.  By avoiding the common approach of 
240. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Gardiner
Harris, Obama Pick Engages Supreme Court Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2016, at A1 (evaluating Judge Merrick Garland as President Obama’s 
nominee to succeed Scalia and reporting on the stated refusal by some 
Republican Senate leaders to consider any nomination until after the 
presidential election).  See generally Martin et al., supra note 20, at Part 
IV.B (modeling predicted changes to the median Justice after the 2004
presidential election given various hypothesized Court retirements and
different combinations of party control of Congress and the presidency).
241. See supra Table 4.
242. See supra Tables 2 & 5 and accompanying text.
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focusing on a few celebrated cases, the resulting analysis offers 
not only a more systematic assessment of influence exercised 
by each jurist, but also provides a baseline for evaluating 
future power shifts on this dynamic, decision-making body. 
As for the Chief Justice, evidence suggests that Roberts 
strategically assigns criminal justice opinions in ways that 
minimizes policy losses and defection from majority 
coalitions.243  Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts not only 
commands a Court that has leaned strongly to the right on 
many criminal justice issues, but he also has occupied the 
central, core position of the dominant conservative wing.244  As 
the median conservative Justice on the Court with respect to 
criminal justice matters in his first decade as Chief Justice, 
Roberts possessed substantial gravitational pull on his fellow 
conservatives as gauged by the dimensions of conservatism 
presented earlier.245  Chief Justice Roberts has kept the 
conservative wing together against dissenting votes from all 
four liberal members of the Court in several important cases.246  
In these, Chief Justice Roberts and his fellow conservatives 
incorporated the right to bear arms247 while ruling in a rights-
restricting fashion with respect to interests of the detained, 
accused, or convicted, such as in cases regarding jury 
selection,248 the death penalty,249 the exclusionary rule,250 strip 
searches,251 right to counsel,252 Miranda and other self-
incrimination protections,253 fair trials and prosecutorial 
243. See supra Part IV.A.
244. See supra Part IV.B.
245. See supra Table 6 rankings by gravity and accompanying text.
246. Of the thirty-one conservative decisions analyzed ending in a five-
member majority, twenty-two (71 percent) found all members of the 
conservative wing lined up against all participating members of the liberal 
wing. 
247. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); see also District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
248. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015).
249. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
250. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); see also Hudson
v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
251. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
252. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
253. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013); see also Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
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misconduct,254 among others.255 
However, the Chief Justice has struggled at times to 
overcome defections by Justices Thomas and Scalia—and more 
frequently by Justice Kennedy and especially in the Court’s 
most divided criminal justice cases.  The ironic result: Chief 
Justice Roberts ranks as one of the most likely Justices to vote 
with the majority in criminal justice cases over the last decade, 
but also is the least likely member of the Court to be on the 
winning side of when the vote count is five-to-four.256  This is a 
particularly notable weakness given the proportion of this 
Court’s decisions ending in a minimally-winning majority.  If 
Justice Scalia’s replacement is more inclined to join the liberal 
wing, as opposed to the remaining conservative Justices in 
such cases, Chief Justice Roberts’s influence in split decisions 
would likely diminish further.  More generally, Chief Justice 
Roberts could lose much of his significant control over opinion 
assignments if the liberal wing becomes dominant.257 
Justice Kennedy has been by far the Justice most likely to 
be in the majority of sharply divided criminal justice decisions. 
While considerable attention understandably has been afforded 
Justice Kennedy’s influence on the Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence,258 he has cast outcome-determining votes on 
254. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
255. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 41, at 428-33 (discussing
conservative activism and other developments in five-to-four conservative 
criminal justice decisions by the Roberts Court). 
256. During the period analyzed, Chief Justice Roberts was part of only
45 percent of five-member majorities (thirty-one of sixty-nine).  Remarkably, 
in the remaining 194 criminal justice cases in which he participated, he voted 
with the majority 190 times (98 percent). 
257. Notably, it would be a rare development in the modern era for a
Court to be dominated by an ideological wing that did not include the Chief 
Justice.  Chief Justice Roberts and his Court, to date, have been conservative, 
as was true for Chief Justices Rehnquist and Burger.  Liberal Chief Justice 
Warren led a Court that favored the criminally accused in most years.  For 
ideological characterizations of particular Court eras, see generally Schwartz, 
supra note 30; Smith et al., supra note 46; Smith & McCall, supra note 54; 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).  See also HOWARD 
GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 
331 (1991); Galloway, supra note 30.  
258. See, e.g., Linda E. Carter, The Evolution of Justice Kennedy’s
58https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/4
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several other criminal justice questions.  After so doing, he 
often wrote the Court’s decision.259  As the leading author of the 
Court’s non-unanimous, criminal justice opinions over the last 
decade (and author of more non-unanimous, liberal opinions 
than any member of the liberal wing),260 Justice Kennedy has 
been a powerful voice on a range of issues.  However, his 
formidable role as median Justice has been a function of the 
distribution of philosophical approaches and policy preferences 
on the Court, and that configuration may change dramatically 
in the next few years and perhaps as soon as Justice Scalia’s 
successor is confirmed. 
Indeed, the timelier question is not ‘Who leads the Court’ 
but rather ‘Who will lead the Court in the near future?’  Not 
only will Justice Scalia’s successor alter the dynamics of the 
Court, but commentators also have mused over the 
implications of the possible retirements of Justices Ginsburg 
(83 years old) and Breyer (77).261  Justice Kennedy—now the 
longest serving member on the Court—celebrated his eightieth 
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence on Categorical Bars in Capital Cases, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 229 (2013) (examining Justice Kennedy’s leadership role 
in constitutional interpretation in a select type of death penalty cases); 
Kenneth C. Haas, The Emerging Death Penalty Jurisprudence of the Roberts 
Court, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 387, 436 (2008) (predicting that Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) “almost certainly will be decided by a five-to-
four vote with Justice Kennedy providing the pivotal vote.  Moreover, it is 
likely to be one of many future death penalty cases in which Justice 
Kennedy’s reaction to arguments about how to interpret and apply the 
Eighth Amendment will prove to be decisive.”); Christopher Dunn, Justice 
Kennedy: The Man in Control of the Death Penalty, 238 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2007) 
(noting that the Court decided seven death penalty cases during the 2006-
2007 Term, each ending in a five-to-four vote in which the four most liberal 
Justices lined up against the four most conservative Justices, with Justice 
Kennedy casting the deciding vote).  
259. See supra Part V.B.
260. See supra Table 9.
261. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Court icons Scalia and Ginsburg: Together
at the peak, USA TODAY (Feb. 14, 2015, 5:37 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/13/supreme-court-
scalia-ginsburg/23184991/; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, An Aging Court Raises 
Stakes of Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, at A18; Sarah E. 
Pugh, Predicting the Fate of the Judiciary After Obama, 7 STUDENT PULSE 2 
(2015), http://www.studentpulse.com/a?id=995 (last visited Nov. 20, 2016); 
Randall Kennedy, The Case for Early Retirement, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 28, 
2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/87543/ginsburg-breyer-
resign-supereme-court.  
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birthday in July 2016.262 
Because Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Kennedy’s 
power bases derive substantially from the particular divisions 
on the Court, the degree to which each will continue to exert 
such influence will be affected by the Senate’s unwillingness to 
consider President Obama’s nomination to replace Justice 
Scalia,263 and on what nomination opportunities the new 
President receives.264  When the Court’s composition does 
change in yet unforeseeable ways, the measures in this Article 
sketching the contours of power wielded by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Kennedy in criminal justice cases will 
serve as important benchmarks by which to evaluate the 
impact of new members. 
262. SUP. CT. OF THE U.S, supra note 8 (click on Biographies of current
Justices of the Supreme Court). 
263. See Shear et al., supra note 240; See also Fred Imbert, McConnell:
Senate Won’t Consider Garland Nomination, CNBC (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:23 
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/16/president-obama-to-announce-
supreme-court-nominee-at-11-am-et.html. 
264. See, e.g., Rebecca Shabad, How Could the Next President Reshape
the Supreme Court? CBSNEWS (Jan. 5, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-next-president-could-reshape-the-
supreme-court/ (summarizing likely nomination opportunities prior to Justice 
Scalia’s death and quoting law professor Stephen Wermiel as saying, “I think 
there’s no denying the next president is likely to have a very significant 
impact on the court.”). 
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